

NO. D-130018-C

HOLLIE TOUPS, MARISSA DEITZ, MARISSA JEFFCOTT, MARIANNA TASCHINGER, CAITLYN LaGRONE, MEEGHAN FALLS, CORINA LUMMUS, KELSI GOOK, KINSEY STAUDT, JESSICA DUPUY, ASHLEY MARTIN, JILLIAN HOWARD, MALLORY PETRY, LARAMIE GILBERT, TAYOR BARNWELL, PATRICIA HINSON, MARGARET NOBLE, AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS

Vs.

GODADDY.COM, TEXXXAN.COM, UNIDENTIFIED DEFENDANTS THAT INCLUDE, (1) THE PERSONS AND/OR ENTITIES HOSTING TEXXXAN.COM, AND (2) ALL SUBSCRIBING MEMBERS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

ORANGE COUNTY, TEXAS

260TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DEFENDANT GODADDY.COM, LLC'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO AMEND AND CERTIFY THE COURT'S APRIL 17, 2013 ORDER FOR INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW PURSUANT TO RULE 168 OF THE TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND SECTION 51.014(d) OF THE TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE


TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant GoDaddy.com, LLC ("Go Daddy"), will move this Court, the Honorable Buddie J. Hahn, 260th District Court, 801 W. Division Street, Orange, Texas 77630, on May 30, 2013 at 2:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, for an order to amend and certify the Court's April 17, 2013 Order denying Go Daddy's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 168 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Counsel for Go Daddy met and conferred with counsel for Plaintiffs on April 24, 2013 to determine whether Plaintiffs would consent or otherwise no oppose Go Daddy's motion. As of the filing of this motion, Plaintiffs' counsel had not yet advised of Plaintiffs' position with respect to this Motion.

Dated: April 29, 2013
Irvine, California

Respectfully submitted,



Aaron M. McKown (Texas Bar No. 24081612)
Paula L. Zecchini
Wrenn Bender LLLP
2 Park Plaza, Suite 550
Irvine, CA 92614
Tel: 949-202-5818
Fax: 949-679-7939

Mark Simon (Texas Bar No. 18387790)
Scheef & Stone, LLP
500 N. Akard, Suite 2700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel: 214.706.4230
Fax: 214.706.4242

Attorneys for Defendant GoDaddy.com, LLC

NO. D-130018-C

HOLLIE TOUPS, MARISSA DEITZ, MARISSA JEFFCOTT, MARIANNA TASCHINGER, CAITLYN LaGRONE, MEEGHAN FALLS, CORINA LUMMUS, KELSI GOOK, KINSEY STAUDT, JESSICA DUPUY, ASHLEY MARTIN, JILLIAN HOWARD, MALLORY PETRY, LARAMIE GILBERT, TAYOR BARNWELL, PATRICIA HINSON, MARGARET NOBLE, AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS

Vs.

GODADDY.COM, TEXXXAN.COM, UNIDENTIFIED DEFENDANTS THAT INCLUDE, (1) THE PERSONS AND/OR ENTITIES HOSTING TEXXXAN.COM, AND (2) ALL SUBSCRIBING MEMBERS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

ORANGE COUNTY, TEXAS

260TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT GODADDY.COM, LLC'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO
AMEND AND CERTIFY THE COURT'S APRIL 17, 2013 ORDER FOR
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Rule 168 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Defendant GoDaddy.com, LLC ("Go Daddy") submits this memorandum of points and authorities in support of its motion for certification of the Court's Order of April 17, 2013 (the "Order") for interlocutory review. As detailed below, the the Order meets the criteria for certification for immediate appeal. As a result, Go Daddy respectfully requests that the Court amend the Order to certify the following issues: (1) whether immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (the "CDA") bars each of the

claims asserted against Go Daddy as a matter of law and (2) whether Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, have alleged facts that, if true, state a claim against Go Daddy under Texas law.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs' Claims

Plaintiffs' action is brought on behalf of a putative class of women who allege that the individual defendants published sexually explicit photographs of them without their permission on two websites, WWW.TEXXXAN.COM and WWW.TEXXXANS.COM. Plaintiffs admit that Go Daddy had no involvement in the creation, development, or publishing of the offending content at issue. *See* Am. Pet. ¶¶ 11, 13; Second Am. Pet. ¶ 13. Rather, Plaintiffs allege only that Go Daddy provided Internet hosting services to the operator of the two websites. *See id.*

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs claim that the provision of such Internet services constituted grossly negligent violations of the Texas Penal Code, intentional invasion of Plaintiffs' privacy, intentional disclosure of Plaintiffs' private facts, intentional intrusion of Plaintiffs' right of seclusion, wrongful appropriation of Plaintiffs' name and likeness, and intentional placement of Plaintiffs' in a false light. *See* J. Morgan Letter to Court dated 4/18/13 at ¶ 3. Plaintiffs also claim that by providing such hosting services, Go Daddy participated in a civil conspiracy with the operator of the websites and the individual defendants who allegedly created, developed, and published the offending material at issue. *See id.*

B. Statutory Immunity Under Section 230 of the CDA

In 1996, Congress enacted Section 230 of the CDA to eliminate uncertainties in the law governing whether providers of interactive computer services, such as Go Daddy, could be liable for harms resulting from the dissemination of tortious or otherwise harmful content created or developed by users of those services or by other third parties. In passing Section 230, Congress made the policy decision to immunize interactive service providers from liability under state law for harm caused by the dissemination of third-party information.

Congress recognized that imposing liability on online intermediaries like Go Daddy for unlawful third-party content would threaten the development of the online industry as a medium

for new forms of mass communication and would create disincentives to self-regulation of such content by responsible service providers. As a result, Congress determined that liability should rest with the actual wrongdoers—the originators of illegal and harmful content—and not intermediary services, like Go Daddy, whose systems are sometimes abused by such wrongdoers.

C. Procedural History

The Texas Supreme Court recently adopted changes to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which permitted for the first time the filing of a motion to dismiss. *See* Tex. Rules of Civ. Proc. 91a. Rule 91a is modeled after Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and became effective on March 1, 2013.

On March 8, 2013, Go Daddy filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 91a. The crux of Go Daddy's motion was (1) that the immunity afforded Go Daddy as an Internet service provider under Section 230 of the CDA barred each of Plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law; and (2) even if Plaintiffs' claims were not barred, Plaintiffs nonetheless failed to assert facts that, if true, state a claim against Go Daddy. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Go Daddy's motion on April 9, 2013; the Court heard oral argument on April 16, 2013. On April 17, 2013, the Court denied Go Daddy's motion. No statement of decision has been issued.

III. ARGUMENT

On a party's motion or on its own initiative, a trial court in a civil action may, by written order, certify an order to the court of appeals for interlocutory review when the court believes that the order involves "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" and that "an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(d)(1)-(2). Because the requirements for certifying an interlocutory order for appeal are identical to those under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the case law interpreting Section 1292 is instructive.

Here, Go Daddy requests that the Court certify for interlocutory review the Order because there are controlling questions of law, substantial differences of opinion exist, and an immediate

appeal would advance the disposition of this litigation.

A. A Controlling Issue of Law Exists

A question constitutes a “controlling issue of law” if resolution of the question could determine the outcome or future course of the litigation. *See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group*, 233 F.Supp.2d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing *Johnson v. Burken*, 930 F.2d 1202, 1206 (7th Cir. 1991) (a question is controlling if “interlocutory reversal might save time for the district court and time and expense for the litigants”).

Here, the issues proposed for certification – whether Plaintiffs have alleged facts that, if true, state a cause of action under Texas law and whether the immunity under Section 230 of the CDA bars any of those claims – are controlling issues of law.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 91a by its very nature challenges the sufficiency of the claims asserted by Plaintiffs as a matter of law. Under Rule 91a, the Court must accept all well pleaded facts as true. The Court then determines whether those facts are sufficient to state a claim and whether a defense exists that would otherwise bar such a claim.

Here, Go Daddy filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against it by AMPAS under two theories: (1) Plaintiffs failed to state facts sufficient to support its intentional tort and gross negligence claims against Go Daddy as a matter of law; and (2) even if such claim were sufficiently stated, Go Daddy enjoys statutory immunity under Section 230 of the CDA as a result of Plaintiffs’ admissions in its pleadings that Go Daddy merely provided hosting services and did not create, develop, or publish the allegedly offending content at issue. The Court denied Go Daddy’s motion. A reversal of the Order would result in the final determination of Plaintiffs’ claims against Go Daddy. As a result, an interlocutory review of the Order will save the Court, Go Daddy, and Plaintiffs the time and expense of further litigating these issues. Thus, controlling issues of law exist that render the Order appropriate for interlocutory review.

B. A Substantial Ground for Differences of Opinion Exists

The existence of contrary, inconsistent, or unclear authority constitutes a “difference of opinion,” warranting interlocutory review. *See, e.g., APCC Servs. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co.*, 297

F.Supp.2d 90, 97-98 (D.D.C. 2003), *rev'd on other grounds*, 418 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2005), *cert. granted and judgment vacated*, 127 S. Ct. 2094 (2007). Certification of interlocutory review is appropriate even in the absence of difference of opinions, where “the case law is confused.” *Johnson v. Washington Area Transit Auth.*, 790 F. Supp. 1174, 1180 (D.D.C. 1991) (certifying interlocutory review on district court’s decision issued on remand).

Because of the infancy of Rule 91a, there are no published Texas authorities regarding its interpretation and application. Go Daddy filed its motion to dismiss under rule 91a one week after it became effective. Thus, the absence of authority relating to Rule 91a is enough in and of itself to certify the Order for interlocutory review.

The law in Texas, however, is also unsettled regarding whether, when, and to which type of claims CDA immunity under Section 230 applies. The only state appellate decision that has confronted the issue of CDA immunity did not reach a decision regarding whether intentional tort claims under Texas law are barred by such immunity.¹ *See Milo v. Martin*, 311 S.W.3d 210, 215 (2010) (“[W]e find no reported Texas opinion that has addressed whether section 230 preempts Texas defamation law relating to situations involving internet service providers who provide access to defamatory third-party created content.”). In affirming the trial court’s granting of a no-evidence motion, the Court expressly stated that while such a claim may “arguably not [be] within the reach of the Communications Decency Act of 1996” or its immunity to Internet service providers under Section 230, whether “an intentional infliction claim is available as a remedy [is] a matter we need not decide.” *Id.* at 217. Moreover, unlike in this case where Plaintiffs assert seven intentional tort and two gross negligence claims, *Milo* dealt with a single claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. *Id.* at 215.

¹ The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas also addressed the CDA, but only in the context of whether it completely preempted all state law. Recognizing that the immunity did not apply to those responsible for creating or developing content, the court held, consistent with authorities throughout the United States, that the CDA did not completely preempt all state law claims. *See Cisneros v. Sanchez*, 403 F.Supp.2d 588, 593 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (remanding case removed by defendant on claim of federal preemption). The court did not, however, identify which, if any, state law claims were beyond the reach of CDA immunity against a hosting provider such as Go Daddy or the circumstances in which such immunity would not apply under Texas law.

Other courts that have addressed CDA immunity have held that any claim, intentional or otherwise, that seeks to treat the service provider as if it is the publisher of the offending content is barred by Section 230. *See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc.*, 206 F.3d 980, 984–85 (10th Cir.2000) (“47 U.S.C. § 230 creates a federal immunity to any state law cause of action that would hold computer service providers liable for information originating with a third party.”); *Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.*, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir.1997) (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”); *Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, Inc.*, No. Civ.A. 02-1964, 2002 WL 31844907, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 17, 2002) (“[A]ny claim made by the plaintiffs for damages or injunctive relief with regard to either defamation and libel, or negligence and fault[], are precluded by the immunity afforded by Section 230(c)(1), and subject to dismissal.”). Indeed, courts have applied Section 230 to the very claims at issue here: negligence,² invasion of privacy,³ infliction of emotional distress,⁴ and injunctive relief.⁵

Plaintiffs have asserted seven intentional torts and two claims of gross negligence against Go Daddy based on Go Daddy’s provision of Internet hosting services. Plaintiffs readily admit that Go Daddy did not create, develop, or publish the offending content at issue. Thus, whether CDA immunity would bar liability under Texas law for these nine claims is a matter of first

² *See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.*, 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003); *Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co.*, 206 F.3d at 984-85; *Zeran*, 129 F.3d at 332; *Doe*, 783 So. 2d at 1013-17; *Green*, 318 F.3d at 468.

³ *See, e.g., Carafano*, 339 F.3d at 1122; *Barrett*, 799 N.E.2d at 920; *Roskowski v. Corvallis Police Officers’ Ass’n*, No. Civ. 03-474-AS, 2005 WL 555398 (D. Or. March 9, 2005).

⁴ *See, e.g., Donato v. Moldow*, 865 A.2d 711, 713 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005); *Jane Doe One v. Oliver*, 755 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 2000).

⁵ *Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.*, 26 1 F.Supp.2d 532, 540 (E.D. Va. 2003) (“[G]iven that the purpose of § 230 is to shield service providers from legal responsibility for the statements of third parties, § 230 should not be read to permit claims that request only injunctive relief.”); *Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc.*, No. 97-485 LH/LFG, 1999 WL 727402, at *3 (D.N.M. Mar. 1, 1999) (“[T]he Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from the Defendants continued publication of inaccurate stock information. AOL is again entitled to Section 230 immunity and this claim will be dismissed as well.”), *aff’d*, 206 F.3d 980, 983-86 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000).

impression for the appellate courts thereby rendering it appropriate to certify the Order for interlocutory review. Indeed, the apparent conflict between the concerns expressed in *dicta* in *Milo* and the authorities throughout the United States provides a sufficient difference of opinion so as to warrant immediate appeal.

C. Certification Would Materially Advance the Disposition of the Litigation.

Interlocutory review constitutes material advancement of litigation where “[a]n immediate appeal would conserve judicial resources and spare the parties from possible needless expense.” *APCC Servs.*, 297 F.Supp.2d at 100. An immediate appeal in this case would materially advance the disposition of this litigation by resolving the key question of whether Plaintiffs may maintain their claims in this case against Go Daddy, and in turn, whether they may pursue their claims as a class action. In the event that the Court of Appeals determines that CDA immunity applies to any or all of Plaintiffs’ claims or that Plaintiffs cannot otherwise state a claim under Texas law against Go Daddy based on the facts alleged, Plaintiffs would no longer be able to pursue those dismissed claims against Go Daddy individually or on behalf of a class. Indeed, given the authorities supporting the application of CDA immunity to Internet service providers in circumstances presented in this case, there is a good likelihood that interlocutory review would end the litigation as to Go Daddy for the hundreds or potentially thousands of women who are putative class members.

An appellate determination of the viability of Plaintiffs’ claims against Go Daddy at this juncture will enable Plaintiffs, and putative class members, to determine whether they can proceed with their claims against Go Daddy at all or whether the case will be limited to the individuals responsible for creating, developing, and publishing the allegedly offending content. In the event that interlocutory review is not granted in this case, the parties would be forced to litigate the claims against Go Daddy, including unique issues such as Plaintiffs’ claim that Section 230 immunity applies only if the speech at issue is protected by the First Amendment. Certifying an interlocutory appeal as requested will conserve both the parties’ and the Court’s resources, and obviate the possibility of expensive and time-consuming duplicative proceedings.

See Phillip Morris, 2004 WL 1514215 at *3 (citing *APCC Servs.*, 297 F.Supp.2d 90, 100).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Go Daddy respectfully requests that this Court certify its Order for interlocutory review pursuant to Rule 168 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code on the questions of whether: (1) whether immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act bars each of the claims asserted against Go Daddy as a matter of law; and (2) whether Plaintiffs have alleged facts that, if true, state a claim under against Go Daddy as a matter of law. Go Daddy further requests that the Court amend its Order to state the conditions necessary for interlocutory review have been met.

Dated: April 29, 2013
Irvine, California

Respectfully submitted,



Aaron M. McKown (Texas Bar No. 24081612)
Paula L. Zecchini
Wrenn Bender LLLP
2 Park Plaza, Suite 550
Irvine, CA 92614
Tel: 949-202-5818
Fax: 949-679-7939

Mark Simon (Texas Bar No. 18387790)
Scheef & Stone, LLP
500 N. Akard, Suite 2700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel: 214.706.4230
Fax: 214.706.4242

Attorneys for Defendant GoDaddy.com, LLC

NO. D-130,018-C

HOLLIE TOUPS, MARISSA DEITZ, MARISSA JEFFCOTT, MARIANNA TASCHINGER, CAITLYN LaGRONE, MEEGHAN FALLS, CORINA LUMMUS, KELSI GOOK, KINSEY STAUDT, JESSICA DUPUY, ASHLEY MARTIN, JILLIAN HOWARD, MALLORY PETRY, LARAMIE GILBERT, TAYOR BARNWELL, PATRICIA HINSON, MARGARET NOBLE, AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS

Vs.

GODADDY.COM, TEXXXAN.COM, UNIDENTIFIED DEFENDANTS THAT INCLUDE, (1) THE PERSONS AND/OR ENTITIES HOSTING TEXXXAN.COM, AND (2) ALL SUBSCRIBING MEMBERS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

ORANGE COUNTY, TEXAS

260TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

AMENDED ORDER

Having considered GoDaddy.com, LLC's ("Go Daddy") request for certification and amendment to this Court's April 17, 2013 Order (the "Order") denying Go Daddy's Motion to Dismiss, and having reviewed the briefs and the law, this Court is of the opinion that the Order involves controlling questions of law as to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion. As such, an immediate appeal from the Order will materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. The Court therefore certifies the Order for immediate interlocutory appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court certifies the following issues: (1) whether immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (the "CDA") bars each of the claims asserted against Go Daddy as a matter of law based on Plaintiffs' admission that Go Daddy did not create, develop, or publish the content at issue; and (2) whether, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have alleged facts that, if true, state a claim against Go Daddy.

Buddie J. Hahn, Presiding Judge

PROOF OF SERVICE

Hollie Toups, et al. v. GoDaddy.com, et al.

I, Laura T. Juarez, on April 29, 2013, served the foregoing documents described as: **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO AMEND AND CERTIFY THE COURT'S APRIL 17, 2013 ORDER FOR INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW PER RULE 168 OF THE TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND SECTION 51.013(d) OF THE TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTES AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF; and AMENDED ORDER** on all interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope and addressed as follows:

John S. Morgan, P.C. *Via Facsimile MORGAN LAW FIRM 2175 North Street, Suite 101 Beaumont, TX 77701	Attorneys for Plaintiffs Hollie Toups, et al. Tel: (409) 239-5984 Fax: (409) 835-2757 E-mail: jmorgan@jsmorganlaw.com
Hunter Taylor *Via FedEx 8325 Bridgefield Orange, TX	Defendant
Jim Sharon Bearden, Jr. *Via Facsimile THE BEARDEN LAW FIRM 116 Border Orange, TX 77630	Attorneys for Defendant Tel: (409) 883-4501 Fax: (409) 883-0259
Steve Carlton *Via Facsimile CARLTON LAW PRACTICE 805 Henderson Avenue Orange, TX 77630	Attorneys for Defendant Tel: (409) 886-5531 Fax: (409) 886-5926
Mark Simon *Via Facsimile SCHEEF & STONE, LLP 500 N. Akard, Suite 2700 Dallas, TX 75201	Attorneys for Defendant Tel: (214) 706-4200 Fax: (214) 706-4242
Jim Harris *Via Facsimile Rick Hatfield HARRIS, DUESLER & HATFIELD 550 Fannin, Suite 650 Beaumont, TX 77701	Attorneys for Defendant Tel: (409) 832-8382 Fax: (409) 833-4240

BY FACSIMILE and FedEx.

STATE - I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Texas that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 29, 2013, at Irvine, California.


LAURA T. JUAREZ



WRENN/BENDER

Two Park Plaza
Suite 550
Irvine, CA 92614
Tel: (949) 202-5818
Fax: (949) 679-6730
www.wrennbender.com

Facsimile Cover

Date: Monday, April 29, 2013

From: Aaron M. McKown Telephone: (949) 202-5818

Sent By: Laura T. Juarez Telephone: (949) 202-5820

To: **John S. Morgan** Fax Number: **(409) 835-2757**
Morgan Law Firm

Jim S. Bearden, Jr. Fax Number **(409) 883-0259**
The Bearden Law Firm

Steve Carlton Fax Number **(409) 886-5926**
Carlton Law Practice

Mark Simon Fax Number **(214) 706-4242**
Sheef & Stone, LLP

Jim Harris Fax Number **(409) 833-4240**
Harris, Duesler & Hatfield

Re: *Hollie Toups, et al. v. GoDaddy.com, et al.*
Cause No. D 130,018-C

Matter No.: 12001-003 Number of Pages Including Cover: (#)

Message:

If all pages are not received, please call (949) 202-5720

CONFIDENTIAL NOTICE

This e-mail/fax transmission contains confidential or legally privileged information, which is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named in this transmittal. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or reliance upon the contents of this e-mail is strictly prohibited. If you received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately, and please forward the e-mail or fax, back to us with notification that you have deleted the transmission from your system.