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Wiretap Overview

Overview Government Surveillance of Telephones and the Internet


Search & Seizure
The Dept. of Justice has written a manual on the rules for seizing evidence stored in computers. "Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations"
Carnivore
Carnivore is a computer program designed by the FBI to intercept Internet communications.

CDT's Carnivore Reference Page


CALEA
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA) was supposed to preserve law enforcement surveillance capabilities in the face of technological chage, but the FBI has been trying to use it to claim control over the design of the telephone network to enhance its surveillance powers.

CDT's CALEA Reference Page


Roving Wiretaps
A roving wiretap order allows the government to tap any phone lines that a suspect may use.

-Congress Passes "Roving Wiretaps," Expands Surveillance Authority
-E-RIGHTS Bill (S. 854) tightens standard for roving taps


Echelon
Echelon is a secretive international surveillance system that operates outside of the normal limitations of the Constitution.

International Monitoring by US government


FIDNet
FIDNet is a comprehensive monitoring system intended to protect government computers, but it raises serious privacy concerns.

CDT's FIDNet Reference Page


CESA
CESA was a bill proposed by the Clinton Administration that would allow the government to seize decryption keys without notice to the user.

CDT's CESA Reference Page


Articles

   
FBI Guidelines
 

Concerns about Chilling Effect of Revised FBI Guidelines on First Amendment Activities

Center for National Security Studies & Open Society Institute

The Attorney General (AG) has issued revised guidelines governing the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) surveillance of presumptively lawful activities. The proposed changes to Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations ("domestic guidelines") substantially expand the FBI’s powers to monitor political associations, places of worship, libraries and use of the World Wide Web. There can be little question that surveillance under these guidelines will have a chilling effect on the exercise of rights to free expression and association protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.

Apart from their chilling effect on First Amendment activity, these changes are most noteworthy for their irrelevance to preventing either the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 or the types of failures of intelligence or investigation that the FBI has been faulted for relative to those. The FBI already had the authority under its distinct and unrelated (classified) guidelines for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism investigations ("international guidelines") to carry out the types of surveillance proposed to be carried out under the recent changes, without suspicion of criminal activity. Clearly, the lack of sufficient authority does not explain the intelligence failures prior to the September 11 attacks. Ineffective use of those powers and the information gathered thereby does.

There is thus no merit to the Attorney General’s attempt to portray these changes as necessary to rectify the deficiencies recently identified in the FBI’s investigations before September. Changes in FBI internal administrative procedures would be significantly more responsive to that set of problems. Recent revelations also suggest that so would improvements in the Central Intelligence Agency’s sharing of information with the FBI.

It should also be noted that it is highly unlikely that the types of surveillance authorized under the recent changes would have led to identification of the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks on September 11. They uniformly adopted profiles that emphasized not drawing attention to themselves as likely terrorists according to the traditional indicia of religious, cultural or political association, personal habits, identity or appearance. They were not active in mosques, did not participate in political groups, or articulate commitment to radical causes.

The collection of large amounts of information with no relationship to terrorist activity will in fact divert attention and resources that should be targeted at preventing terrorism.

The types of inquiry that the FBI will now have almost unbridled power to maintain include broad fishing expeditions into any and all associations and according to any and all criteria that the FBI chooses as long as it is for the permitted purpose. License plates of all people attending a place of worship may be noted down. So may the presence of people at political, intellectual, academic or theological discussions. The FBI may tape the sermons or other proceedings during worship services. It may use commercial databases and data-mining services and software to collect information about movements, habits and tastes to generate patterns and lists of individuals, according to the broadest criteria.

Under the old domestic guidelines "preliminary inquiries" -- investigations without any reasonable indication of criminal activity -- could be maintained by the FBI for 90 days. Beyond the 90 days, and in the absence of evidence of criminal activity, FBI headquarters had to approve the investigations. Under the changed guidelines, these investigations may continue for one year absent any indication of criminal activity, and without any supervision or approval from FBI headquarters as to their propriety and legality.

If law abiding citizens know that their first amendment activities could lead to their being profiled and spied on, for example for membership in a particular church or mosque, or for engaging in charitable work through that faith community, their exercise of their rights will be chilled.

While the stated intention of the new guidelines is to identify terrorist activity, they contain no protection against misuse against persons who hold disfavored political or religious opinions. That these concerns are not far-fetched is borne out by the exactly analogous FBI abuses, the "COINTELPRO" program among others, which led to adoption of the guidelines in the first instance. Under that program civil rights, labor and peace groups were systematically spied upon by the FBI, in collaboration with local police and private groups. Furthermore, the program included activities of "agents provocateurs".

Indeed, these abuses continued even after adoption of the guidelines, when the FBI spied on the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) under the classified foreign terrorism guidelines. What that suggests is that, rather than loosening the domestic guidelines for surveillance, what is required in more effective oversight of the inevitably enhanced use of the very considerable powers that the FBI already possesses.

For more information, contact:
Ken Gude
Policy Analyst
The Center for National Security Studies
1120 19th Street, NW, 8th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 721-5655, fax (202) 530-0128


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