CDT POLICY POST Volume 10, Number 3, February 3, 2004

A Briefing On Public Policy Issues Affecting Civil Liberties Online
from
The Center For Democracy and Technology


(1) Security Holes at DMVs Feed ID Theft, Offer Lessons for National ID Card Debate

(2) Driver's License Facing Wider Uses, including Online Authentication

(3) Lax Security and Insider Abuse at the Local Level Pose National Challenges



(1) Security Holes at DMVs Feed ID Theft, Offer Lessons for National ID Card Debate

CDT has released a report pointing to security problems nationwide in the issuance of driver's licenses, at a time when the card is being increasingly looked to as a general form of identification. Culling news reports in the last year alone, the report found two dozen cases in 15 states where bribery or lax security at Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) offices had resulted in fraudulent issuance of thousands of driver's licenses. The survey offers a warning to those who think that adding more biometric information to driver's licenses will make them reliable as a de facto national ID card.

Based on the findings of the survey, CDT recommends:

Even with these measures, CDT recommends against reliance on any system that links state driver's license data for ID purposes unrelated to highway safety. Instead, security measures should rely on the concept of multiple forms of identification for different purposes. It is a well-known, but often forgotten, principle of security that broad reliance on a single form of identification creates a single point of failure. The security breaches that CDT's report catalogues in DMV offices across the country are a reflection of the incentives for fraud already being generated by overburdening the driver's license as a general purpose ID card.

CDT's report, "Unlicensed Fraud: How bribery and lax security at state motor vehicle offices nationwide lead to identity theft and illegal driver's licenses," is at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20040200dmv.pdf.



2) Driver's License Facing Wider Uses, including Online Authentication

The state-issued driver's license is playing an important role in an increasing range of areas:

In 2002, several proposals were put forth to create a National ID card or, more subtly, to create a back end database connecting driver's license information across the country and to begin to incorporate digital biometric information, such as a fingerprint, into the card and the linked databases. None of the major legislation on the subject has been reintroduced in this Congress, but more moderate proposals may be introduced this session.

For more background information on the use of the driver's license as a general ID card, see:



(3) Lax Security and Insider Abuse at the Local Level Pose National Challenges

CDT has been concerned that policymakers interested in ID issues are too focused on the quality of the driver's license as an identity document - thus proposals to improve the biometrics on the card - and are overlooking the bigger concern that the driver's license system is riddled with fraud at the point of issuance. All the biometrics in the world won't make a secure card if DMV employees can be bribed or the card-making equipment can easily be stolen. Our concern has been that the fraud issue, of grave national consequence, was being treated mostly as a local concern.

In October 2002, CDT called upon the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) to begin compiling an index of cases of internal and external fraud relating to the issuance of driver's licenses at the DMVs. CDT believed fraud was more widespread than realized and that all state agencies should be evaluated and ranked based on performance. When AAMVA did not take up the idea, CDT undertook a survey of local news coverage in 2003 and found:

Some of the more egregious cases include:



Detailed information about online civil liberties issues may be found at http://www.cdt.org/.

This document may be redistributed freely in full or linked to http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp_10.03.shtml.

Excerpts may be re-posted with prior permission of ari@cdt.org

Policy Post 10.03 Copyright 2004 Center for Democracy and Technology

C D T
Valid HTML 4.01! Valid CSS! Bobby Approved (v 3.2)