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  **         **      **       ***               POLICY POST  
  **         **      **       ***               
  **         **      **       ***               March 24, 1995
  **         **      **       ***               Number 6
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  CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY
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  A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online
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CDT POLICY POST 3/24/95                                      Number 6

CONTENTS: (1) CDT Analysis of Revised Exon Indecency Legislation
          (2) Section 223 as amended by Communications Decency Act
          (3) About the Center For Democracy and Technology

This document may be re-distributed freely provided it remains in its 
entirety.

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CDT ANALYSIS OF REVISED EXON INDECENCY LEGISLATION

I.  OVERVIEW

A revised version of the Communications Decency Act (S.314) was added to the 
Senate telecommunications reform legislation as the reform bill was reported 
out of the Senate Commerce Committee.  In an important improvement over the 
original version, several exemptions have been created to limit criminal 
liability of online services providers where they exercise no control over 
content.  However, despite this significant change the bill is still an 
unconstitutional intrusion of the free speech and privacy rights of Internet 
users and all content providers in interactive media.   (The complete text of 
the bill interleaved into the current statute is attached at the end of this 
Policy Post.)

In simple terms, the Communications Decency Act would enshrine in statute a 
sharp distinction between the print medium and new interactive media.  The 
bill subjects interactive media to the same weak First Amendment protections 
that have evolved for mass media.  Moreover, it places all speech that occurs 
on the Internet and elsewhere in cyberspace under the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Communications Commission.  Both the interactive media and the print 
media are arenas in which individuals and organizations exercise core First 
Amendment free speech rights.  Thus, new interactive media -- which includes 
not only email and Internet servicese, but also interactive TV, video on 
demand and distance learning -- must be protected by the First Amendment.

The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) remains actively opposed to this 
bill.  With the help of Senator Leahy and other civil liberties advocates in 
Congress, we will fight to keep it from being enacted and continue to search 
for alternatives to this dangerous legislation.  CDT believes that federal 
legislation is needed to solidify free speech rights and clarify online 
service provider liability.  Without such legislation, a series of state 
legislative proposed as bad or worse than the Exon/Gorton bill will 
proliferate.  Restrictive proposals already under consideration in states such 
as Maryland, Oregon, and Washington must be pre-empted.  We will work with 
concerned legislators and the Interactive Working Group (an ad hoc coalition 
of public interest organizations, and computer, communication, and publishing 
firms) to develop alternatives.

II.  ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PROPOSAL

The Exon/Gorton bill was introduced to promote the important purpose of 
protecting minors from access to controversial and inappropriate sexually 
explicit material in interactive media including the Internet, other 
commercial online services, electronic bulletin board services (BBS's).  
However, because the proposed statute is grafted onto a twenty five year-old 
provision of the Communications Act which was designed for a centralized 
monopoly telephone environment, instead of diverse, decentralized interactive 
media, it both fails to accomplish its goal and is unconstitutional on its 
face.  In spite of the changes made by Senator Exon, the bill still suffers 
the following critical defects from the standpoint of users and content 
providers:

1.      SECOND CLASS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS FOR USERS AND CONTENT PROVIDERS ON 
        THE NET AND ALL INTERACTIVE MEDIA:  Even though many laud cyberspace as 
        the new electronic gutenberg printing press accessible to all, the Exon 
        bill treats the Internet, interactive television, and video dialtone 
        systems as if they were one big radio station whose broadcasts are 
        constantly assaulting unwilling listeners.  Those who use these new 
        technologies know that this is not the case.  However, viewing 
        interactive media as an extension of broadcasting diminishes the First 
        Amendment rights of all who use these systems and create content for 
        them.  For example, though an individual is allowed to go into a 
        bookstore and buy a sexually-explicit magazine or a "lewd" work of art, 
        one would not be able to access the identical information over the 
        Internet if this legislation is enacted.  

2.      FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION JURISDICTION OVER ONLINE SPEECH:  The 
        defenses to prosecution established in the new version of the bill gives
        the Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction to establish rules 
        governing distribution of content online.  This will have a dramatic 
        chilling effect on online activity and squelch the development of 
        interactive media.  Regulation of indecency in this new medium is a bad 
        precedent for all kinds of speech in the interactive world.

3.      CRIMINALIZATION OF BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MESSAGES THAT ARE NOT 
        OBSCENE: The Act criminalizes not only obscene, but also "lewd, 
        lascivious, filthy, or indecent" communications, all of which are 
        protected by the First Amendment and cannot be banned.  


4.      IMPERMISSIBLY INTRUSIVE MEANS OF ACHIEVING LEGITIMATE GOAL:  First 
        Amendment jurisprudence requires that restrictions on speech adopt the 
        "least restrictive means" available for achieving a compelling purpose.
        Relying on technological assumptions applicable only to 900 number 
        services and a centrally-controlled telephone system, the Act fails to 
        account for the fact that government restriction on content is 
        unnecessary in interactive media, where parents can control the content 
        that their children access.

5.      FAULTY ANALOGY TO BROADCAST MEDIA: Proponents of the Act have justified
        the constitutionality by improper reliance on content restrictions found
        acceptable in broadcast media. These arguments fail to recognize that 
        while broadcast media may "assult" unwilling listeners, who may be
        in need of government protection, interactive media enables users to
        control the information that they receive.

6.      INVASION OF PRIVACY:  By criminalizing the content of private, non-
        obscene messages, the Act would force an invasion of the realm of 
        private electronic communications and end the individual's ability to 
        control the content of information he or she chooses to access in 
        private.

Alternative means of achieving the goal of protecting minors from access to 
material considered inappropriate by their parents would include:

1.      FEDERAL LEGISLATION ESSENTIAL TO PROTECT FREE SPEECH ON THE NET: 
        CDT believes that there mujst be federal legislation to solidify free
        speech rights and clarify carrier liability which pre-empts state
        legislation in this area.  Otherwise, as series of state legislative
        proposed where are as bad or worse than the Exon/Gorton bill will
        proliferate.  

2.      MAXIMUM RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY TO EMPOWER PARENTS:  Interactive media 
        offers parents and other users the ability to filter certain kinds of 
        content.  Instead of relying on government censorship, or even 
        government-imposed rating systems, parents should be able to block the 
        delivery of certain information to their children on the basis of their 
        own individual tastes and preferences.

3.      CLEAR PROTECTION FOR CONSTITUTIONALLY-PERMISSIBLE SPEECH:  Any 
        alternative legislation must provide affirmative protection for 
        constitutionally-permissible speech, even if it is lewd, filthy or 
        otherwise controversial.  The First Amendment demands that offensive or 
        disturbing speech must be treated separately than that which is clearly 
        obscene and unprotected.

4.      EMPHASIS ON ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING STATUTES:  Federal and state law 
        already prohibits transportation of obscenity, child pornography, as 
        well as, in many instances threats, stalking and harassment.  To the 
        extent that there are obstacles to enforcing these laws in the new on-
        line environment, Congress should examine whether new law is required, 
        or whether more resources for enforcement (including training for law 
        enforcement in interactive services and cooperative efforts with the 
        industry).

5.      CODIFICATION SEPARATELY FROM EXISTING DIAL-A-PORN STATUTE:
        Modification of the existing ¤ 223, originally written for the analogue
        telephone system, to regulate new interactive media causes unnecessary 
        confusion, both for the treatment of the new technology and with 
        respect to the stability of the regulation of audiotext services. If new 
        is written, it should stand on its own. Moreover, Congress should 
        consider which elements properly belong in the Communications Act and 
        which in the Criminal Code.

The regulation of speech, commerce, and privacy rights in new interactive 
communications systems raises many difficult issues of public policy and 
constitutional law.  Before proceeding with legislation, Congress must provide 
the opportunity for public hearings to identify clearly the problems that 
exist, and to identify solutions that are appropriate to the new technology.  
Failure to do so will result in ineffective policy, years of constitutional 
litigation, and a disastrous chilling effect on the development and growth of 
a very promising new communications medium.


For More Information Contact:

Center for Democracy and Technology     

Jerry Berman            
Daniel Weitzner         
(voice) +1.202.637.9800


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TEXT OF STATUTE WITH PROPOSED AMENDMENT:

Substantial changes from previous version include:

-- the term 'knowingly' has been added to section (a)(1)(A)
-- additional defenses have been added in subsection (d)

**NOTE:         [] = deleted 
                                ALL CAPS = additions

TITLE 47.  TELEGRAPHS, TELEPHONES, AND RADIOTELEGRAPHS  
CHAPTER 5.  WIRE OR RADIO COMMUNICATION  
COMMON CARRIERS

47 USCS | 223 (1992)

| 223.  [Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District
of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications]

OBSCENE OR HARASSING UTILIZATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
DEVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OR IN 
INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS"

   (a) Whoever--

   (1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign 
communication by means of [telephone] TELECOMMUNICATIONS
DEVICE--

  [ (A) makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent;]

   (A) KNOWINGLY --
        
        (i)  MAKES, CREATES, OR SOLICITS, AND
        (ii) INITIATES THE TRANSMISSION OF,

ANY COMMENT, REQUEST, SUGGESTION, PROPOSAL, IMAGE, OR OTHER COMMUNICATION 
WHICH IS OBSCENE, LEWD, LASCIVIOUS, FILTHY, OR INDECENT;

   (B) makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, 
without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, 
threaten, or harass any person at the called number;

   (C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or 
continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the 
called number; or

   (D) makes repeated telephone calls, during which conversation 
ensues, solely to harass any person at the called number; or

   (2) knowingly permits any [telephone] TELECOMMUNICATIONS facility
under his control to be used for any purpose prohibited by this section, shall 
be fined not more than $[50,000]100,000 or imprisoned  not more than [six 
months] TWO YEARS, or both.
                                         
   (b)(1) Whoever knowingly--

   [(A) within the United States, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by 
recording device) any obscene communication for commercial purposes to any 
person, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the 
call;]

    (A) WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, BY MEANS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVICE --

        (i)  MAKES, CREATES, OR SOLICITS, AND
        (ii) PURPOSEFULLY MAKES AVAILABLE,

ANY OBSCENE COMMUNICATION FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES TO ANY PERSON, REGARDLESS OF 
WHETHER THE MAKER OF SUCH COMMUNICATION PLACED THE CALL OR INITIATED THE 
COMMUNICATION; OR
        
  (B) permits any [telephone facility] TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
FACILITY under such person's control to be used for an activity 
prohibited by subparagraph (A), shall be fined in accordance with 
title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two 
years, or both.

   (2) Whoever knowingly--

  [ (A) within the United States, by means of telephone, 
makes (directly or by recording device) any indecent communication for 
commercial purposes which is available to any person under 18 years of age or 
to any other person withoutthat person's consent, regardless of whether the 
maker of such  communication placed the call; or ]

   (A) WITH THE UNITED STATES, BY MEANS OF TELEPHONE OR TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
DEVICE,

        (i)  MAKES, CREATES, OR SOLICITS, AND
        (ii) PURPOSEFULLY MAKES AVAILABLE (DIRECTLY OR BY RECORDING DEVICE)

ANY INDECENT COMMUNICATIONS FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES WHICH IS AVAILABLE TO ANY 
PERSON UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON WITHOUT THAT PERSON'S 
CONSENT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE MAKER OF SUCH COMMUNICATION PLACED THE 
CALL; OR
                                                
   (B) permits any [telephone facility] TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
FACILITY under such person's control to be used for an activity 
prohibited by subparagraph (A), shall be fined not more than 
$[50,000] 100,000 or imprisoned not more than [six months]
TWO YEARS, or both.

   (3) It is a defense to prosecution under paragraph (2) of this 
subsection that the defendant restrict access to the prohibited 
communication to persons 18 years of age or older in accordance 
with subsection (c) of this section and with such procedures as the 
Commission may prescribe by regulation.

   (4) In addition to the penalties under paragraph (1), whoever, 
within the United States, intentionally violates paragraph 
(1) or (2) shall be subject to a fine of not more than $[50,000] 
100,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each 
day of violation shall constitute a separate violation.

   (5)(A) In addition to the penalties under paragraphs (1), (2), 
and (5), whoever, within the United States, violates paragraph (1) 
or (2) shall be subject to a civil fine of not more than $[50,000] 
100,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each 
day of violation shall constitute a separate violation.

   (B) A fine under this paragraph may be assessed either--

   (i) by a court, pursuant to civil action by the Commission or 
any attorney employed by the Commission who is designated by the 
Commission for such purposes, or

   (ii) by the Commission after appropriate administrative 
proceedings.

   (6) The Attorney General may bring a suit in the appropriate 
district court of the United States to enjoin any act or practice 
which violates paragraph (1) or (2). An injunction may be granted 
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

   (c)(1) A common carrier within the District of Columbia or 
within any State, or in interstate or foreign commerce, shall not, 
to the extent technically feasible, provide access to a 
communication specified in subsection (b) from the
[telephone] TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVICE  of any subscriber who has not 
previously requested in writing the carrier to provide access to such 
communication if the carrier collects from subscribers an identifiable charge 
for such communication that the carrier remits, in whole or in part, to the 
provider of such communication.

   (2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), no cause of action may 
be brought in any court or administrative agency against any common 
carrier, or any of its affiliates, including their officers, 
directors, employees, agents, or authorized representatives on 
account of--

   (A) any action which the carrier demonstrates was taken in good 
faith to restrict access pursuant to paragraph (1) of this 
subsection; or 

   (B) any access permitted--

   (i) in good faith reliance upon the lack of any representation 
by a provider of communications that communications provided by 
that provider are communications specified in subsection (b), or

   (ii) because a specific representation by the provider did not 
allow the carrier, acting in good faith, a sufficient period to 
restrict access to communications described in subsection (b).

   (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, a provider 
of communications services to which subscribers are denied access 
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection may bring an action 
for a declaratory judgment or similar action in a court. Any such 
action shall be limited to the question of whether the 
communications which the provider seeks to provide fall within
the category of communications to which the carrier will provide 
access only to subscribers who have previously requested such 
access.

        (d) ADDITIONAL DEFENSES; RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS; JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
RESPECTING RESTRICTIONS. --

                (1) NO PERSON SHALL BE HELD TO HAVE VIOLATED THIS SECTION
WITH RESPECT TO ANY ACTION BY THAT PERSON OR A SYSTEM UNDER HIS CONTROL
THAT IS LIMITED SOLELY TO THE PROVISION OF ACCESS, INCLUDING TRANSMISSION,
DOWNLOADING, INTERMEDIATE STORAGE, NAVIGATIONAL TOOLS, AND RELATED
CAPABILITIES NOT INVOLVING THE CREATION OR ALTERATION OF THE CONTENT OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS, FOR OTHER
PERSON'S COMMUNICATIONS TO OR FROM A SERVICE, FACILITY, SYSTEM, OR NETWORK NOT 
UNDER THAT PERSON'S CONTROL.

                (2) IT IS A DEFENSE TO PROSECUTION UDER SUBSECTIONS (a)(2),
(b)(1(B), AND (b)(2)(B) THAT A DEFENDANT LACKED EDITORIAL CONTROL OVER THE
COMMUNICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THIS SECTION.

                (3) IT IS A DEFENSE TO PROSECUTION UNDER SUBSECTIONS
(a)(2), (b)(1)(B), AND (b)(2)(B) THAT A DEFENDANT HAS TAKEN GOOD FAITH,
REASONABLE STEPS, AS APPROPRIATE --

                        (A) TO PROVIDE USERS WITH THE MEANS TO RESTRICT    
            ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION;

                        (B) PROVIDE USERS WITH WARNINGS CONCERNING THE     
    POTENTIAL FOR ACCESS TO SUCH COMMUNICATIONS;

                        (C) TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINTS FROM THOSE WHO ARE    
            SUBJECTED TO SUCH COMMUNICATIONS;

                        (D) TO PROVIDE MECHANISMS TO ENFORCE A PROVIDER'S  
            TERMS OF SERVICE GOVERNING SUCH COMMUNICATIONS; OR

                        (E) TO IMPLEMENT SUCH OTHER MEASURES AS THE        
            COMMISSION MAY PRESCRIBE TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS
PARAGRAPH. NOTHING IN THIS SECTION IN AND OF ITSELF SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO
TREAT ENHANCED INFORMATION SERVICES AS COMMON CARRIAGE.

                (4) INADDITION TO OTHER DEFENSES AUTHORIZED UNDER THIS
SECTION, IT SHALL BE A DEFENSE TO PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION (b) THAT A
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENGAGED IN A COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY THAT HAS AS A PREDOMINATE
PURPOSE AN ACTIVITY
SPECIFIED IN THAT SUBSECTION.

                (5) NO CAUSE OF ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT IN ANY COURT OR ANY
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AGAINST ANY PERSON ON ACCOUNT OF ANY ACTION WHICH THE
PERSON HAS TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH TO IMPLEMENT A DEFENSE AUTHORIZED UNDER THIS
SECTION OR OTHERWISE TO RESTRICT OR PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF, OR ACCESS
TO, 
A COMMUNICATION SPECIFIED IN THIS SECTION. THE PRECEDING SENTENCE SHALL NOT 
APPLY WHERE THE GOOD FAITH DEFENSES UNDER SUBSECTION (c)(2) APPLY.

        (6) NO STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT MAY IMPOSE ANY LIABILITY IN CONNECTION 
WITH A VIOLATION DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (a)(2), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) THAT IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE TREATMENT OF THOSE VIOLATIONS UNDER THIS SECTION 
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT NOTHING HEREIN SHALL PRECLUDE ANY STATE OR LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT FROM ENACTING AND ENFORCING COMPLEMENTARY OVERSIGHT, LIABILITY, AND 
REGULATORY SYSTEMS, PROCEDURES, AND REQUIREMENTS SO LONG AS SUCH SYSTEMS, 
PROCEDURES, AND REQUIREMENTS GOVERN ONLY INTRASTATE SERVICES AND DO NOT RESULT 
IN THE IMPOSITION OF INCONSISTENT OBLIGATIONS ON THE PROVISION OF INTERSTATE 
SERVICES.

        (e) FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION (a) AND (b), THE TERM 'KNOWINGLY'
MEANS AN INTENTIONAL ACT WITH ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF
THE COMMUNICATION SPECIFIED IN THIS SECTION TO ANOTHER PERSON.

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ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY

The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest
organization. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public
policies that advance constitutional civil liberties and democratic 
values in new computer and communications technologies. 

Contacting us:

General information on CDT can be obtained by sending mail to 


www/ftp/gopher archives are currently under construction, and should be 
up and running by the end of March. 

                                 ###