CDT | FBI's CALEA Implementation Plan

Pursuant to Section 110 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, the Attorney General is submitting to each member of the Judiciary and Appropriations Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate this implementation plan for the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 established the Telecommunications Carrier Compliance Fund (TCCF) for making reimbursements to telecommunications carriers, equipment manufacturers, and providers of telecommunications support services for CALEA modifications, pursuant to the reimbursement provisions of Section 109 of CALEA. TCCF funds are not available for obligation unless the implementation plan is submitted and the Congress does not by law block or prevent the obligation of such funds. In accordance with Section 110 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, the implementation plan covers four major sections: Capability Information; Capacity Information; Prioritization of Equipment, Facilities, and Services; and Projection of Reimbursement Plans.

CALEA Background. In October of 1994, Congress took action to protect public safety and national security by enacting CALEA. Telecommunications networks are routinely used by the most heinous and violent criminals in the nation. Federal law allows for restricted use of court authorized electronic surveillance in the investigation of these criminals. This type of investigative tool is continually used by all Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the investigation of kidnappings, extortions, murder, illegal drug trafficking, major white collar crimes, organized crime, terrorism, and national security matters. During the last 14 years, evidence obtained from court-authorized interceptions has been directly responsible for convicting 26,000 dangerous felons.

Even though electronic surveillance is crucial to effective law enforcement, it is used sparingly. Federal law and laws in 41 states only allow the use of this technique in the investigation of serious criminal offenses, when other techniques have not worked, will not work, or are too dangerous. All states provide law enforcement access to dialed telephone numbers using less intrusive pen register and trap and trace devices. This type of interception accounts for the vast majority of all interceptions.

Law enforcement's ability to perform court-authorized electronic surveillance to protect the public safety has been seriously threatened by rapid changes in telecommunications technologies. The loss or erosion of these investigative techniques would be devastating in the fight against crime. CALEA sets forth in statute the interception assistance capability requirements that telecommunications carriers need to meet and maintain within their networks to assist law enforcement in conducting electronic surveillance. CALEA also requires the Attorney General to specify, through official notice, the capacities required for electronic surveillance based upon geographic areas.

The Capability Information section of the implementation plan describes law enforcement assistance capability requirements and provides an explanation of law enforcement's recommended interface for delivery of intercepted communications and call-identifying information. To meet the challenges posed by changes in telecommunications technology, CALEA establishes assistance capability requirements that are to be implemented through consultation and coordination between industry and law enforcement. The implementation plan cites the assistance capability requirements as stated in Section 103 of CALEA. Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies have consulted extensively with the wireline and wireless telecommunications industry standards groups, industry associations, telecommunications carriers, and equipment manufacturers to clarify questions related to lawfully authorized electronic surveillance since the enactment of CALEA. Through consultations and through independent requests from carriers and manufacturers, the telecommunications industry advised law enforcement that information regarding law enforcement's electronic surveillance delivery needs through an acceptable technological interface would help industry comply with the assistance capability requirements set forth in Section 103 of CALEA, in general, and in Section 103(a)(3), in particular. In response, law enforcement embarked on developing a first-ever joint Federal, State, and local law enforcement technical recommendation for the delivery of intercepted communications from a carrier network to a law enforcement agency. The resulting product is referred to as the Electronic Surveillance Interface (ESI) Document. Issue 1.0 of the ESI Document was released as law enforcement's contribution to wireline and wireless industry standards groups in June and July 1996.

In order to ensure the efficient industry-wide implementation of interception assistance capability requirements that meet those specified in section 103, CALEA contemplates the development of publicly available technical requirements or standards by the telecommunications industry. As part of the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA), an entity known as TR45.2 (a cellular-based standards organization) is currently engaged in drafting a technical standard referred to as PN-3580. Although TR45.2 typically produces only wireless standards, both wireline and wireless industry representatives are participating with this organization on a joint standards effort for CALEA. In addition, a detailed technical requirements document (SR 3529) has been produced for those functions in PN-3580 applicable to wireline networks. Although the standards process has progressed to the point of the PN-3580 standards document being sent out for formal industry review and balloting, law enforcement has repeatedly commented that the PN-3580 standards document, as written, does not include all of the functionality required to satisfy evidentiary needs dictated by law and the courts. Further, law enforcement has also commented that the open-ended nature of the PN-3580 document and its lack of technical specificity (by comparison with the wireline SR-3529 technical requirements document and the ESI) effectively preclude a meaningful determination of whether the provisions set forth in the PN-3580 standard will, in fact, fully meet the capability requirements required by section 103 of CALEA. Law enforcement continues to provide comments on the PN-3580 standard regarding missing functionality and the level of specificity.

The Capacity Information section describes the proposed actual and maximum capacity requirements for the estimated number of simultaneous law enforcement communication interceptions, pen register and trap and trace device-based interceptions that authorized law enforcement agencies may seek to conduct. CALEA recognizes that over time, most future interceptions will be fulfilled through equipment controlled by telecommunications carriers. Consequently, CALEA directs the Attorney General to provide carriers with notifications regarding law enforcement's future actual and maximum capacity requirements that a telecommunications carrier should be able to accommodate in a given geographic area as of 3 years after the filing of the Final Notice of Capacity and thereafter.

On October 16, 1995, law enforcement's estimated actual and maximum capacity requirements were presented in an Initial Notice published in the Federal Register. Comments on the Initial Notice were accepted through January 16, 1996. On January 14, 1997, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) published the Second Notice of Capacity in the Federal Register for comment and review. To develop the information presented in the Initial Notice and Second Notice, law enforcement established a historical baseline of simultaneous interception activity from which future interception needs could be projected. This effort entailed an unprecedented, detailed review and analysis of the available information on Federal, State, and local law enforcement interceptions throughout the United States. The collected information was expressed as "simultaneous" interceptions (interpreted as those interceptions occurring on the same day). The historical baseline of simultaneous interceptions was then used as the basis for deriving actual and maximum capacity requirements, which are included in the appendices of the implementation plan.

The Prioritazation of Carrier Equipment, Facilities, and Services section discusses the development of a prioritized list of carrier equipment, facilities, and services deployed on or before January 1, 1995, to be modified by carriers at the request of law enforcement based on its investigative needs. Business processes for equipment modifications are relatively "standardized" throughout the telecommunications industry and can be summarized into three primary stages: systems engineering, engineering development, and systems deployment. To parallel established industry business processes, CALEA implementation initiatives are segmented into four major steps: 1) identify and prioritize candidate equipment platforms based on law enforcement needs and industry network data; 2) determine the portion of the prioritized list of equipment platforms selected for systems engineering reimbursement; 3) identify the priority equipment platforms that should undergo engineering development; and 4) identify deployment of the CALEA solution on specific systems in geographic regions.

In completing step one, law enforcement has focused on identifying those switching platforms and associated intelligent network peripherals (INPs) in the carriers' networks that are of primary concern for meeting CALEA's capability requirements. These priority equipment platforms, once identified, will be correlated with each carrier's network to determine the corresponding priority carriers for implementation. An initial analysis of priority equipment platforms has been completed based primarily on historical interception activities. Of the switching platforms in use in wireline and cellular networks, analysis of historical interception activity for the period January 1993 through March 1995 reveals that the majority of interception activity occurred on 19 platforms.¹ These priority switching platforms, which will be the focus of the Government's CALEA implementation efforts, were associated with approximately 97 percent of wireline interceptions and approximately 96 percent of cellular interceptions that occurred during the analysis period. The number of priority equipment platforms that can be reimbursed for systems engineering, engineering development, and systems deployment is determined by balancing cost estimates for modifications with available CALEA funding. Initial reimbursement funding models, based on preliminary Government estimates for systems engineering and engineering development costs, indicate that selecting 14 of the 19 priority switching platforms maximizes solution development and deployment of priority equipment within the limits of the $500,000,000 authorized to be appropriated for CALEA reimbursement efforts.

The guiding objective of law enforcement's approach to the prioritization of equipment, facilities, and services is to maximize the Government's return on investment for all CALEA appropriations by ensuring that those areas that historically are a priority to law enforcement are covered. This approach controls costs and mitigates risks in the implementation of CALEA activities by establishing a clear set of priorities for optimal allocation of CALEA funding. Cooperative agreements will be initiated with the telecommunications industry to optimize Government spending planned in support of implementation activities. One of the primary purposes of employing cooperative agreements is to maximize benefits to telecommunications carriers by making solutions available to all carriers at a fair and reasonable price.

The Projected Reimbursement Plan section presents a projected reimbursement plan that estimates the cost for the coming fiscal year and for each fiscal year thereafter, based on the prioritization of law enforcement needs. Given current assumptions in the President's 1998 budget, the estimates of annual funding are as follows: 1) Current Year (Fiscal Year 1997), $100 million; 2) Fiscal Year 1998, $100 million; 3) Fiscal Year 1999, $100 million; 4) Fiscal Year 2000, $100 million; and 5) Fiscal Year 2001, $100 million. Because the CALEA solution development process will begin and end under industry's schedules, appropriate levels of funding must be available at a pace consistent with these schedules. This need drives reimbursement planning projections. Further, sufficient funding must also be available to sustain the industry business process for priority equipment platforms.

The FBI intends to enter into cooperative agreements for reimbursement of modifications to equipment platforms that are deemed high priority to law enforcement. General cost and schedule estimates for systems engineering and engineering development have been developed based on current information available about the telecommunications industry business process. Using these estimates, the $100,000,000 anticipated to be available in FY 1997 will be allocated between systems engineering and engineering development activities. The dollar amount allocated to each specific platform for systems engineering and the engineering development in FY 1997 will not be known until the execution of cooperative agreements in mid-1997. In addition, since the cooperative- agreements have not been executed, it is not possible to specify which carriers, manufacturers, and support service providers will receive reimbursement. These details will be provided in the next CALEA annual report. While reimbursement via the cooperative agreement process focuses on systems engineering and engineering development for FY 1997, outyear reimbursement priorities will shift toward systems deployment. Fiscal year funding and outyear reimbursements will be balanced to ensure the optimum relative funding levels between systems engineering, engineering development, and systems deployment.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 (Public Law 104-208) established the Department of Justice Telecommunications Carrier Compliance Fund (TCCF) for making payments to telecommunications carriers, equipment manufacturers, and providers of telecommunications support services pursuant to Section 109 of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). In addition to establishing the TCCF, the 1997 Appropriations Act requires the Attorney General to submit to Congress an implementation plan for CALEA prior to the expenditure of funds. In particular, Section l 10 of the Act states:

"Availability of Funds for Expenditure. - Funds shall not be available for obligation unless an implementation plan as set forth in subsection (e) is submitted to each member of the Committees on the Judiciary and Appropriations of both the House of Representatives and the Senate and the Congress does not by law block or prevent the obligations of such funds. Such funds shall be treated as a reprogramming of funds under Section 605 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1997, and shall not be available for obligation or expenditure except in compliance with the procedures set forth in that section and this section."

According to Section 110 of the Act, the contents of the implementation plan are to include:

"(1) the law enforcement assistance capability requirements and an explanation of law enforcement's recommended interface;

" (2) the proposed actual and maximum capacity requirements for the number of simultaneous law enforcement communications intercepts, pen registers, and trap and trace devices that authorized law enforcement agencies may seek to conduct, set forth on a

county-by-county basis for wireline services and on a market service area basis for wireless services, and the historical baseline of electronic surveillance activity upon which such capacity requirements are based;

"(3) a prioritized list of carrier equipment, facilities, and services deployed on or before January 1, 1995, to be modified by carriers at the request of law enforcement based on its investigative needs;

"(4) a projected reimbursement plan that estimates the cost for the coming fiscal year and for each fiscal year thereafter, based on the prioritization of law enforcement needs as outlined in (3), of modification by carriers of equipment, facilities and services, installed on or before January 1, 1995."

Pursuant to Section 110 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, the CALEA implementation plan is submitted to each member on the Judiciary and Appropriations Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

B. CALEA BACKGROUND

In October of 1994 and at the request of the Nation's law enforcement community, Congress took action to protect public safety and national security by enacting the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). The purpose of CALEA is to make clear a telecommunications carrier's duty to cooperate in the interception of communications for law enforcement purposes, and for other purposes. CALEA sets forth in statute the interception assistance capability requirements that telecommunications carriers need to meet and maintain within their networks to assist law enforcement in conducting electronic surveillance. CALEA also requires the Attorney General to specify, through official notice, the capacities required for electronic surveillance based upon geographic areas.

Unfortunately, our Nation's telecommunications networks are routinely used by the worst and most violent criminals and terrorists to carry out their criminal activities-activities which threaten the personal safety and economic well-being of the innocent, law abiding citizens of our Nation. Longstanding Federal law allows for the tightly controlled use of court-authorized communications interceptions in the investigation of the most serious criminal offenses. Of particular note, Federal law only allows for the use of this investigative technique when there is probable cause to believe that communications are being used in furtherance of serious criminal activity, and only when the law enforcement agency shows that other investigative techniques have not worked, or will not work, or are too dangerous.

In many cases, there is no substitute for the use of lawfully authorized electronic surveillance in gathering evidence, in preventing and solving crimes, and in bringing violent criminals to justice. Court-authorized communications interceptions are one of the most valuable tools in America's arsenal to fight crime. This critically important and extremely effective investigative technique has been and continues to be used by Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies in the investigation of serious violent criminal acts, such as kidnapping, extortion, and murder; in the investigation of illegal drug trafficking, by, for example, Federal, State, and local agencies involved with the Southwest Border Initiative, and by the Major Metropolitan Drug Task Forces; in the investigation of major fraud, corruption and white collar crime activity; in the investigation of organized crime and racketeering; in the investigation of domestic and international terrorism; in the investigation of espionage and national security matters; and in the investigation of other serious criminal activity. During the past 14 years, court-authorized communications interceptions have been directly responsible for obtaining the conviction of more than 26,000 dangerous felons. This does not include the thousands of other Federal, State and local law enforcement investigations that have succeeded, in part, because of the use of lawfully authorized call-identifying information interceptions.

In addition to the Federal Government, 41 states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia have statutes allowing for the use of court-authorized communications interceptions by law enforcement in the investigation of the most serious criminal acts. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the Department of Justice report that a total of 1,895 Federal, State, and local law enforcement applications for the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications (wiretaps) were approved by the courts in l995, of which 1,198 were related to criminal investigations and 697 were in support of national security investigations. Approximately 69 percent of the criminal electronic surveillance orders were related to narcotics investigations. It should be noted that the report refers to the number of applications for wiretaps and is not indicative of the larger number of lines affected. All states provide law enforcement with access to call-identifying information, including dialing-related information. This latter category constitutes the vast majority of all interceptions (approximately 90 percent).

Law enforcement's ability to perform electronic surveillance to protect the public safety has been seriously threatened by rapid changes in telecommunications technologies. Although current communications networks are an important aid for law enforcement in fulfilling its mission, the continuous technological advances in telecommunications systems and networks and the introduction of new digitally based technologies, transmission modes, services, and features have made it increasingly more difficult, if not impossible, for law-enforcement to conduct court-authorized electronic surveillances. In 1994, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provided to Congress the result of an informal survey reflecting 183 cases nationwide where advanced telecommunications equipment had impaired or prevented lawfully authorized electronic surveillance. In a recent 18-month period, in just one locality alone, the FBI was unable to conduct, or was significantly delayed in conducting, 34 court-authorized interceptions. The eventual loss or erosion of these investigative techniques would be devastating to the fight against crime.

On February 24, 1995, the Attorney General delegated management and administration responsibilities of CALEA to the FBI (see 28 CFR 0.85(o)). The FBI's Telecommunications Industry Liaison Unit (TILU), which includes participation by Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers and industry experts, and its Telecommunications Contracts and Audit Unit (TCAU), which consists of accountants, auditors, and contract specialists, will implement and oversee these CALEA responsibilities. The FBI is implementing CALEA on behalf of all Federal, State, and local law enforcement.

To facilitate the implementation of CALEA, the Congress authorized up to $500,000.000 to be appropriated between fiscal years (FY) 1995 and 1998 to pay for certain costs associated with CALEA compliance. CALEA authorizes the Attorney General, subject to the availability of appropriations, to reimburse telecommunications carriers for: 1) all reasonable costs directly associated with the modifications performed by carriers in connection with equipment, facilities, and services installed or deployed on or before January 1, 1995, to establish the capabilities necessary to comply with Section 103 of CALEA; 2) when deemed necessary, the additional reasonable costs directly associated with making the assistance capability requirements found in Section 103 of CALEA reasonably achievable with respect to equipment, facilities, or services installed or deployed after January 1, 1995, in accordance with the procedures established in CALEA Section 109(b); and 3) reasonable costs directly associated with modifications of any of a carrier's systems or services, as identified in the Carrier Statement required by CALEA Section 104(d), that do not have the capacity to accommodate simultaneously the number of interceptions, pen registers, and trap and trace devices set forth in the Final Notice of Capacity published in accordance with CALEA Section 104. With regard to these categories, unless the Attorney General agrees to reimburse a telecommunications carrier for such modifications, the carrier shall be considered to be in compliance. However, in the case of equipment, facilities, and services installed or deployed on or before January 1, 1995, this exemption does not apply if the equipment, facility, or service is replaced or significantly upgraded or otherwise undergoes major modification.

II. CAPABILITY INFORMATION

A. BACKGROUND

To conduct lawful electronic surveillance, law enforcement agencies require access to the communications content and the call-identifying information associated with the telephone service of the subject of an investigation. Recent and continuing advances in telecommunications technologies and services challenge, and at times erode, the existing ability of law enforcement agencies to fully implement lawful orders to intercept such communications and to acquire such call-identifying information. These advances also challenge the ability of telecommunications carriers to meet their assistance responsibilities to law enforcement. As new technologies and services emerge, law enforcement and the telecommunications industry must work together to ensure that industry thoroughly understands law enforcement needs for electronic surveillance. This understanding will, in turn, allow the telecommunications industry to meet its assistance responsibilities as required by CALEA.

B. CALEA ASSISTANCE CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

To meet the challenges posed by changes in telecommunications technology, CALEA establishes assistance capability requirements that are to be implemented through consultation and coordination between industry and law enforcement. The assistance capability requirements cover four basic areas: 1) isolation and interception of a subscriber's communications (i.e., wiretap); 2) access to call-identifying information; 3) delivery of intercepted communications and call identifying information; and 4) providing access unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with any subscriber's telecommunications services. In addition to these basic requirements, Section 103 of CALEA details certain limitations imposed on the assistance capability requirements; special requirements associated with emergency or exigent circumstances; and additional requirements for telecommunications carriers offering commercial mobile services. The law enforcement assistance capability requirements, as stated in Section 103 of CALEA, are:

"SEC. 103. ASSISTANCE CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS.

"(a) Capability Requirements.-Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section and Sections 108(a) and lO9(b) and (d), a telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications are capable of-

"(1) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept, to the exclusion of any other communications, all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier within a service area to or from equipment, facilities, or services of a subscriber of such carrier concurrently with their transmission to or from the subscriber's equipment, facility, or service, or at such later time as may be acceptable to the government;

"(2) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to access call-identifying information that is reasonably available to the carrier-

(A) before, during, or immediately after the transmission of a wire or electronic

communication (or at such later time as may be acceptable to the government); and

(B) in a manner that allows it to be associated with the communication to which it

pertains, except that, with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the

authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in Section 3127 of

title 18, United States Code), such call-identifying information shall not include any

information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the

extent that the location may be determined from the telephone number);

"(3) delivering intercepted communications and call-identifying information to the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, in a format such that they may be transmitted by means of equipment, facilities, or services procured by the government to a location other than the premises of the carrier; and

"(4) facilitating authorized communications interceptions and access to call-identifying information unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with any subscriber's telecommunications service and in a manner that protects-

(A) the privacy and security of communications and call-identifying information not

authorized to be intercepted; and

(B) information regarding the government's interception of communications and

access to call-identifying information.

"(b) Limitations.-

"(1) Design of features and systems configurations: This title does not authorize any law enforcement agency or officer-

(A) to require any specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or

system configurations to be adopted by any provider of a wire or electronic

communication service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or any

provider of telecommunications support services; or

(B) to prohibit the adoption of any equipment, facility, service, or feature by any

provider of a wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of

telecommunications equipment, or any provider of telecommunications support

services.

"(2) Information services; private networks and interconnection services and facilities.- The requirements of subsection (a) do not apply to-

(A) information services; or

(B) equipment, facilities, or services that support the transport or switching of

communications for private networks or for the sole purpose of interconnecting

telecommunications carriers.

"(3) Encryption.-A telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government's ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication.

"(c) Emergency or Exigent Circumstances.- In emergency or exigent circumstances (including those described in sections 2518 (7) or (11)(b) and 3125 of title 18, United States Code, and section 1805(e) of title 50 of such Code), a carrier at its discretion may comply with subsection (a)(3) by allowing monitoring at its premises if that is the only means of accomplishing the interception or access.

"(d) Mobile Service Assistance Requirements.- A telecommunications carrier that is a provider of commercial mobile service (as defined in section 332(d) of the Communications Act of 1934) offering a feature or service that allows subscribers to redirect, hand off, or assign their wire or electronic communications to another service area or another service provider or to utilize facilities in another service area or of another service provider shall ensure that, when the carrier that had been providing assistance for the interception of wire or electronic communications or access to call-identifying information pursuant to a court order or lawful authorization no longer has access to the content of such communications or call-identifying information within the service area in which interception has been occurring as a result of the subscriber's use of such a feature or service, information is made available to the government (before, during, or immediately after the transfer of such communications) identifying the provider of a wire or electronic communication service that has acquired access to the communications.

C. CONSULTATIONS TO ESTABLISH TECHNICAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

Section 107 of CALEA mandates that the Attorney General, in coordination with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, shall consult with appropriate associations and standard-setting organizations of the telecommunications industry, with representatives of users of telecommunications equipment, facilities, and services, and with State utility commissions. Section 107 of CALEA also makes clear "that the absence of technical requirements or standards for implementing the assistance capability requirements of section 103 does not relieve a carrier, manufacturer, or telecommunications support services provider of the obligations imposed by section 103 [assistance capabilities] or 106 [manufacturer consultation and making modifications available on a timely basis]."

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies (hereafter referred to as "law enforcement") have consulted extensively with the wireline and wireless telecommunications industry standards groups, industry associations, telecommunications carriers, and equipment manufacturers to clarify questions related to lawfully authorized electronic surveillance since the enactment of CALEA (see Appendix E). In order to assist in the development of an industry standard for lawfully authorized electronic surveillance capability, law enforcement has participated in more than 190 meetings with wireline and wireless industry standards groups (TR45, TR46, TlP1, and TlS1). Included in this total are meetings with representatives of the United States Telephone Association (USTA), the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), the Personal Communications Industry Association (PCIA), and the PCS-1900 North American Interest Group (NAIG). Law enforcement has also participated in two legal summits hosted by CTIA and one meeting with major service provider attorneys to discuss the interpretation of CALEA capability requirements in Section 103 for standards development. In an effort to move the standards process forward, law enforcement has participated in two meetings with attorneys representing the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) to discuss specific technical issues, and more than 60 meetings, on an individual basis, with representatives of various telecommunications carriers and associations. Finally, law enforcement has participated in more than 70 meetings with equipment manufacturers to determine the feasibility of various capability requirements.

In order to ensure the efficient industry-wide implementation of interception assistance capability requirements that meet those specified in section 103, CALEA contemplates the development of publicly available technical requirements or standards by the telecommunications industry. As part of the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA), an entity known as TR45.2 (a cellular-based standards organization) is currently engaged in drafting a technical standard referred to as PN-3580. Although TR45.2 typically produces only wireless standards, both wireline and wireless industry representatives are participating with this organization on a joint standards effort for CALEA. Through TR45.2, law enforcement and the telecommunications industry have been consulting regularly on the proposed contents of PN-3580. Law enforcement and industry representatives have met and continue to meet at least monthly, and at times weekly, to review technical contributions related to the draft standard. Law enforcement's contributions are essential to ensuring that any standard produced by the industry for CALEA will preserve the availability and integrity of evidence gathered through the use of electronic surveillance. In addition, the RBOCs tasked Bellcore to produce a detailed technical requirements document, referred to as SR-3529, for the functions in PN-3580 applicable to wireline networks.

Although the standards process has progressed to the point of the PN-3580 standards document being sent out for formal industry review and balloting, law enforcement has repeatedly commented that the PN-3580 standards document, as written, does not include all of the functionality required to satisfy evidentiary needs dictated by law and the courts. Further, law enforcement has also commented that the open-ended nature of the PN-3580 document and its lack of technical specificity (by comparison with the wireline SR-3529 technical requirements document and the ESI) effectively preclude a meaningful determination of whether the provisions set forth in the PN-3580 standard will, in fact, fully meet the capability requirements required by section 103 of CALEA. Law enforcement continues to provide comments on the PN-3580 standard regarding missing functionality and the level of specificity. Resolution of these issues may be advanced through the cooperative agreement process which will provide a more detailed technical assessment and costs, as fully described in Section V.

D. LAW ENFORCEMENT'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A DELIVERY INTERFACE

CALEA clarifies the extent to which a telecommunications carrier must provide capabilities to assist law enforcement in conducting lawfully authorized electronic surveillance. In early 1995, the industry membership of the Electronic Communications Service Provider (ECSP) Committee of the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) requested that law enforcement develop a document describing a recommended interface between telecommunications carriers and law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement also received numerous independent requests from carriers and manufactures to provide greater details, specifics, guidance, and recommendations regarding law enforcement's view as to appropriate interface/delivery methods for the transmission of intercepted communications and call-identifying information from a carrier to a law enforcement agency. The telecommunications carriers further advised law enforcement that information regarding the Government's interception delivery needs, articulated in an interface document, though an acceptable technological interface would help industry comply with the four high-level assistance capability requirements set forth in Section 103 of CALEA, in general, and in Section 103(a)(3), in particular.

At the suggestion of industry representatives, law enforcement embarked on developing a first-ever joint Federal, State, and local law enforcement technical recommendation for the delivery of intercepted communications from a carrier network to a law enforcement agency. This effort has consisted of over 200 meeting for consultation with law enforcement officers and industry experts. The resulting products is referred to as the Electronic Surveillance Interface (ESI) Document.

As described in the introduction of the ESI Document, the Electronic Surveillance Interface is law enforcement's recommendation for a logical, physical interface between a telecommunications carrier network and a law enforcement agency's electronic surveillance collection facility. In the ESI Document, it was explained that "electronic surveillance" refers to the interception and monitoring of communications (i.e., wiretap) and/or call-identifying information as set forth in a court order or other legal authorization.

In the ESI Document, law enforcement stated that it recognizes that in many instances the telecommunications services subscribed to by certain electronic surveillance subjects may permit a telecommunications carrier to access and deliver the communications and call-identifying information to the law enforcement agency without the telecommunications carrier having to modify its networks or systems. In these instances, the telecommunications carrier may be fully compliant with the assistance capability requirements set forth in CALEA. For example, a telecommunications carrier could effect a central office- or local loop-based interception using conventional methods of access and delivery and fully meet law enforcement's electronic surveillance needs. Increasingly, however, subjects of electronic surveillance are subscribing to advanced services and features that impede or even preclude law enforcement's full and proper execution of surveillance orders. Network-based solutions (central office-based or others) will likely be required to address these problems. The ESI Document was intended to provide guidance to telecommunications carriers, in the form of law enforcement's recommendations for an electronic surveillance delivery interface, regarding electronic surveillance efforts associated with such advanced telecommunications services and features.

Although there may be a number of technical methods and interfaces for delivering intercepted communications and call-identifying information to law enforcement, the interface recommended in the ESI Document is preferred by the law enforcement community for network based surveillances of subjects who subscribe to advanced services and features. The ESI Document indicated that this electronic surveillance interface would satisfy law enforcement's prospective electronic surveillance needs and would constitute an acceptable means of achieving compliance with the delivery capability requirements under Section 103 of CALEA. For telecommunications carriers that adopt the ESI recommendation, a series of technical requirements are set forth to support the recommended delivery interface.

The ESI Document was prepared in cooperation with representatives of the U.S. law enforcement community, to include the Department of Justice, State Attorney Generals, District Attorneys or state-wide prosecutors, and Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. Its development also involved consultations with telecommunications industry representatives, particularly technical experts from telecommunications equipment manufacturers. The requirements for the ESI are based on law enforcement electronic surveillance needs. The ESI Document does not address the various types of legal authorizations that dictate the specific information to be provided for each type of surveillance. The definition of the ESI and the subsequent deployment of network-based surveillance capabilities by telecommunications carrier do not preclude law enforcement agencies from continuing to use existing subscriber loop-based access techniques.

Definition of ESI requirements was based on analyses of widely deployed wireline and wireless services, which are described in publicly available and industry recognized standards or requirements documents. The services analyzed for the document do not encompass all services deployed in public networks today. However, the analysis of selected services provided the foundation for ESI requirements. The scope of the first issue of the ESI Document is to address law enforcement interface needs for the following telecommunications services and technologies:

Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS)
Centrex services
Custom Calling features
Custom Local Area Signaling Services (CLASSsm)
Cellular services
Intelligent Network (IN) services
Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) services
Integrated Services Digital Network Basic Rate Interface (ISDN BRI).

Personal Communication Services (PCS) were not analyzed during the development of Version 1.0 of the ESI Document. However, most of ESI requirements applicable to the cellular networks can be applied to PCS networks. The ESI notes that the exclusion of any particular telecommunications service or feature in the process of developing the initial ESI Document should not be construed as limiting or altering the authority of law enforcement agencies to intercept call content or call-identifying information involving that service or feature, nor does it affect a telecommunications carrier's obligations under CALEA or other laws. Future issues of the ESI Document may address other telecommunications services and technologies.

Telecommunications carriers are responsible for meeting the assistance capability requirements set forth in CALEA, and it is incumbent on equipment manufacturers and support service providers to cooperate with telecommunications carriers in meeting those obligations on a timely basis. The ESI Document was intended to offer guidance to those entities in the industry. Its use by the industry may occur under the purview of recognized industry associations and standards-setting organizations. The ESI Document is viewed by these organizations as part of law enforcement's contribution to the consultative process. The ESI Document was also intended to assist law enforcement agencies that conduct electronic surveillance and manufacturers of electronic surveillance equipment. The document has the following structure:

Section 1 describes the purpose, scope, and intended audience of the document.
Section 2 provides an overview of a network-based electronic surveillance capability and the ESI. It also defines key terms used throughout the document.
Section 3 specifies the requirements for the general characteristics of the ESI.
Section 4 provides the requirements on various physical interfaces for delivering call content and call-identifying information.
Section 5 details requirements for the delivery of call content.
Section 6 provides the requirements for the delivery of call-identifying information.
Section 7 specifies the requirements for the ESI Messaging protocol, the Surveillance Interface Message Protocol for Law Enforcement (SIMPLE). The SIMPLE requirements describe the messages that should be supported for delivering call-identifying information, message parameters, and parameter values. These requirements also describe the conditions for message generation and delivery.
The document also includes a glossary, a list of acronyms, and a list of references.

In April 1996, law enforcement issued the ESI Document to industry representatives from the ECSP Committee for comments regarding the sensitivity and proposed handling of the document. After receiving comments, Issue 1.0 of the ESI Document was then distributed more widely and was officially submitted as law enforcement's contribution to wireline and wireless industry standards groups in June and July 1996. TILU received a positive response from many individual companies on the ESI Document. In particular, the RBOCs and Bellcore noted that the ESI Document not only was straightforward, but also described a delivery approach that would be less complicated and less expensive than approaches proposed at that time via the Telecommunications Industry Association's subcommittee TR45.2.

III. CAPACITY INFORMATION

A. BACKGROUND

CALEA recognizes that many future interceptions will be fulfilled through equipment controlled by telecommunications carriers. Consequently, CALEA directs the Attorney General to provide carriers with information they will need (a) to be capable of accommodating the actual number of simultaneous interceptions law enforcement might conduct as of October 25, 1998, and (b) to size and design their networks to accommodate the maximum number of simultaneous interceptions that law enforcement might conduct after October 25, 1998. (Although actual and maximum capacity determinations represent estimates for October 25, 1998, and thereafter, telecommunications carrier compliance with capacity requirements is, by terms of CALEA, required by three years after issuance of the Final Notice of Capacity.) These two information elements are referred to in CALEA as actual" and "maximum" capacity requirements. In accordance with Section 104 of CALEA, the Attorney General (through the FBI) must provide notice of law enforcement's future actual and maximum capacity requirements. The statute defines these requirements as follows:

For actual capacity: The actual number of communication interceptions, pen registers, and trap and trace devices, representing a portion of the maximum capacity, that the Attorney General estimates that government agencies authorized to conduct electronic surveillance may conduct and use simultaneously by the date that is 4 years after the date of enactment of CALEA."

For maximum capacity: The maximum capacity required to accommodate all of the communication interceptions, pen registers, and trap and trace devices that the Attorney General estimates that government agencies authorized to conduct electronic surveillance may conduct and use simultaneously after the date that is 4 years after the date of enactment of CALEA."

On October 16, 1995, law enforcement's estimated actual and maximum capacity requirements were presented in an Initial Notice published in the Federal Register. To provide industry and others sufficient time to study and evaluate these capacity requirements, the FBI allowed a 90-day comment period rather than the usual 30-day period. Comments on the Initial Notice were accepted through January 16, 1996. On January 14, 1997, the FBI published the Second Notice of Capacity in the Federal Register for review and comment as required in Section 104 of CALEA. The Second Notice identifies the number of simultaneous interceptions, in terms of ensuring the complete interception of communications content and call-identifying information, regardless of services and features, that law enforcement estimates that a telecommunications carrier should be able to accommodate in a given geographic area as of October 1998 and thereafter.

Since the release of the Initial Notice, law enforcement has participated in over 90 meetings with telecommunications industry representatives, privacy advocates, and other interested parties to receive feedback on the method used to express future actual and maximum capacity requirements. A consultative process was implemented with the RBOCs, GTE, and other carriers to discuss estimated capacity requirements in their respective service areas. In addition to the carriers, various industry associations, such as USTA, CTIA, PCIA, and ECSP, were consulted regarding the models used to derive estimated capacity requirements. This consultative process has helped law enforcement understand the challenges facing the industry and others in applying the capacity requirements. For example, industry expressed specific concerns about the use of percentages in the Initial Notice (i.e. ,-percentage of engineered capacity") for expressing actual and maximum capacity requirements. Industry indicated that the use of percentages added an unnecessary level of ambiguity to the determination of capacity requirements and might overburden telecommunications carriers over time. Additionally, industry believed that separate capacity requirements should be developed for wireline and wireless carriers, and that law enforcement would be best served by using specific numbers to express capacity requirements. After much deliberation, law enforcement concluded that capacity could be separated for wireline and wireless carriers and that capacity could be expressed as fixed numbers rather than percentages. Therefore,

law enforcement concluded that it would be appropriate to issue a Second Notice for comment in order to refine its original approach. The 30-day comment period, provided for in the Second Notice, has been extended an additional 30 days. After the extended comment period closes on 3/15/97, a complete record will be delineated and a Final Notice will be issued that fulfills the obligations of the Attorney General under Section 104(a)(1) of CALEA.

B. PROPOSED ACTUAL AND MAXIMUM CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS

The Second Notice provides the proposed actual and maximum capacity requirements for the number of simultaneous law enforcement communications interceptions, pen registers, and trap and trace devices that authorized law enforcement agencies may seek to conduct, set forth on a county basis for wireline services and on a market service area basis for wireless services. Section 104(a)(2)(B) of CALEA requires law enforcement to identify, to the maximum extent practicable, the capacity needed at specific geographic locations. It was considered essential that these "geographic locations" be ones that 1) historically have not been affected by regulatory changes in the telecommunications market place; 2) would allow flexibility for telecommunications carriers in developing solutions; and 3) would not be affected by changes in the configurations of telecommunications networks.

For wireline carriers, it was determined that county boundaries met the criteria as set above and should be used to define the geographic locations" for estimated capacity requirements. Further, the use of the geographic designation of a county was deemed appropriate because it is used by law enforcement for many jurisdictional boundaries and by telecommunications carriers for their county regulations. The word county" includes boroughs and parishes, as well as the District of Columbia and a few independent cities in Missouri, Maryland, Nevada, and Virginia that are not part of any county. U.S. territories such as American Samoa, Guam, the Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are also treated similarly.

Appendix A lists all actual and maximum capacity requirements by state and county. These requirements represent the simultaneous number of call-content interceptions and wireline interceptions of call-identifying information for each county in the United States and its territories. Law enforcement's county capacity requirements represent its interception needs anywhere within that county. The county capacity requirements apply to all existing and any future wireline carriers offering local exchange service in each county.

For wireless carriers, individual county boundaries were not considered to be a feasible geographic designation for identifying capacity requirements. Instead, it was determined that wireless market service areas-Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), Rural Service Areas (RSAs), Major Trading Areas (MTAs), and Basic Trading Areas (BTAs)-would be the most appropriate geographic designations. Although wireless market service areas comprise sets of counties, the use of such market service areas best takes into account the greater inherent mobility of wireless subscribers. Furthermore, historical information on wireless interceptions could be associated with market service areas.

Appendix B lists all actual and maximum capacity requirements for MSAs and RSAs; Appendix C lists all actual and maximum capacity requirements for MTAs; and Appendix D lists all actual and maximum capacity requirements for BTAs. These requirements represent the number of simultaneous call-content interceptions and interceptions of call-identifying information for each market service area. In all cases, the statement of interception capacity for a wireless market service area reflects law enforcement's requirements anywhere in the service area. The market service area capacity requirements apply to all existing and any future telecommunications carrier offering wireless service in each market.

Section 103(b) of CALEA forbids law enforcement from requiring any carrier to adopt any specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or systems configurations. Because individual carriers configure their networks differently, and may pursue different solutions, it is recognized that some wireline and wireless carriers, respectively, may seek further clarification in applying the county or market service area capacity requirements based upon their particular network configurations and their intended solutions. Thus, the FBI's Telecommunications Industry Liaison Unit will be available to discuss the application of these capacity requirements to a specific telecommunications carrier's network upon request.

C. HISTORICAL BASELINE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY

To comply with CALEA's mandate to project future capacity needs, law enforcement believed it was essential to establish a historical baseline of simultaneous interception activity from which interception needs could be projected. This effort entailed a detailed review and analysis of the available information on Federal, State, and local law enforcement interceptions throughout the United States. Such information had never before been collected in a single repository. It involved identifying sources from which accurate information could be retrieved efficiently. The information required included the numbers of all types of interceptions (communications, pen register, and trap and trace) performed by Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, in terms of the actual number of telephone lines intercepted at each locality. (The term "line" refers to the transmission path from a subscriber's terminal to, the network via a wireline or wireless medium.)

To obtain line-related information regarding past simultaneous interceptions, records of interception activity were acquired from telecommunications carriers, law enforcement officials, and from Federal and State Clerks of Court offices (the official repositories for all interception court orders). The collected information was then expressed as "simultaneous" interceptions using a specific time frame. Law enforcement chose to consider simultaneous interceptions as those occurring on the same day. A historical baseline of simultaneous interceptions was used as the basis for deriving actual and maximum capacity requirements. This historical baseline of simultaneous electronic surveillance activity is listed by county and by market service area in Appendices A through D.

IV. PRIORITIZATION OF CARRIER EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES, AND SERVICES

The CALEA implementation plan is based on setting priorities that balance law enforcement's needs and leverage existing business processes used by the telecommunications industry. The guiding objective of law enforcement's approach is to maximize the Government's return on investment for all CALEA appropriations by ensuring that those areas that historically are a priority to law enforcement are covered by CALEA implementation activities. This approach serves to control costs and mitigate risks in the implementation of CALEA by establishing a clear set of priorities for the optimal allocation of CALEA funding. Cooperative agreements will be initiated with the telecommunications industry in a phased manner to optimize plans for Government spending in support of implementation activities. One of the primary purposes of employing cooperative agreements is to maximize benefits to all telecommunications carriers by making CALEA solutions available at a fair and reasonable price. The implementation activities are segmented into four major steps that parallel industry business processes: establish priorities for 1) equipment, 2) systems engineering, 3) engineering development, and 4) systems deployment.

Industry business processes for equipment modifications are relatively "standardized" throughout the telecommunications industry. Both the telecommunications carriers (for their networks) and equipment manufacturers (for their switching platforms and associated intelligent network peripherals [INPs]) have specific methods and time frames for developing solutions. To be meaningful, CALEA implementation initiatives must be consistent with the established relationships and schedules of the telecommunications industry. These industry business processes can be summarized into three primary stages: systems engineering, engineering development, and systems deployment.

In general, systems engineering is the stage when the equipment manufacturers respond to a customer's requirements for a new service with an analysis of the technical approach and estimated price of development. Systems engineering is generally viewed as a six-month process. The definition of requirements will assist equipment manufacturers in developing the technical approaches on specific switching platforms and associated INPs (hereafter referred to as "equipment platforms") used by a carrier to provide telecommunications services. The completed systems engineering analyses will articulate for the industry and law enforcement the potential costs for development and uncover the technical issues associated with compliance. Systems engineering efforts are expected to begin in the second quarter of FY 1997.

Engineering development is the stage when the equipment manufacturers create detailed designs for hardware and software based on the systems engineering analysis. From the detailed design, the equipment manufacturers make modifications or additions to systems. This stage might result in new software, new hardware, or in many cases, a combination of hardware and software. Typically, engineering development requires an average of 12 months to complete. Engineering development efforts directly follow systems engineering efforts in the industry business process. These efforts will be based on the documentation and quotes completed in systems engineering.

Systems deployment begins following engineering development. In this stage, the solutions are available for installation in telecommunications carriers' networks. For CALEA, systems deployment activities will be reimbursed in the geographic regions of priority for law enforcement based upon the availability of appropriations.

Figure 1 illustrates these major implementation planning steps and their relationship with cooperative agreements, and the industry business process stages. The implementation planning steps enable enhanced analysis as more detailed technical and cost data become available through the incremental development of network modifications for CALEA. The results can be updated and enhanced periodically throughout each FY to reflect the additional data received and the subsequent supporting analyses.

Numerous factors are being considered by law enforcement in each step to prioritize activities related to equipment platforms, as illustrated in Figure 2. The first step is to identify and prioritize candidate equipment platforms based on factors linked to law enforcement needs and industry network data. The second step is to determine which portion of the prioritized list of equipment platforms will be selected for systems engineering reimbursement based on additional factors such as funding availability, estimated costs for systems engineering, and industry willingness to enter into cooperative agreements for CALEA.

The third step is to identify the number of equipment platforms that should undergo engineering development based on additional factors such as funding availability, assessment of technical complexity, and quotes for engineering development costs. The fourth step is to identify deployment of the CALEA solution on specific systems in geographic regions based on factors such as law enforcement's specific county and market deployment needs, industry network plans, and deployment costs.

Step 1: Equipment Priorities

Identifying priority embedded base equipment platforms begins by understanding the extent of each system's historical interception activities. At least 35 switching platforms are in use in wireline and cellular networks. Of these switching platforms, analysis of historical interception activity for the period January 1993 through March 1995 reveals that interception activity occurred on the platforms listed in Figure 3. Figure 3 alphabetically lists the priority switching platforms that will be the focus of the Government's CALEA implementation efforts. As mentioned previously, in addition to the switching platforms identified in Figure 3 there are other network elements that augment switching platforms in telecommunications carrier networks, such as INPs, that may be impacted by CALEA and are also being assessed.

These 19 equipment platforms and INPs were established as priorities based on a number of factors such as: carrier switching platforms with high historical interception activity, technical impediments to law enforcement, platform market share, manufacturers' marketing plans and support for the platform, platform architecture, service provider market share, and potential for common solution development for similar platforms. An examination of historical interception activity for the period from January 1993 through March 1995 revealed that the wireline platforms shown in Figure 3 represent approximately 97 percent of wireline interceptions. The wireless platforms listed represent approximately 96 percent of cellular interceptions that occurred during the same period. The remaining switching platforms were not considered a priority for one or more of the following reasons: negligible historical interception activity (significantly less than one percent), minimal technical impediments to law enforcement's capability to perform electronic surveillance, negligible market share (less than one percent), or little to no industry support for new feature development. The FBI is currently meeting with telecommunication carriers and equipment manufacturers to gather the additional information required to further prioritize the list to support efforts of selecting equipment platforms for systems engineering in step 2.

Step 2: Systems Engineering Priorities

The number of priority equipment platforms that can be reimbursed for systems engineering is determined by balancing cost estimates for modifications with available CALEA funding. Currently, the Government cost estimates for systems engineering, engineering development, and systems deployment are based on initial estimates made by subject matter experts who have experience developing and deploying switching platform software and hardware in telecommunications carrier networks. These Government cost estimates provide a rough order of magnitude estimate based upon a generic work process and are for planning purposes only. The Government cost estimates are the product of: 1) developing a work breakdown structure for the systems engineering and engineering development stages; 2) defining the composition of typical task teams per the work breakdown structure; 3) identifying the subtasks to be performed by the teams and the associated levels of effort per subtask and team member; 4) estimating labor rates for the team members; 5) multiplying the level of effort and labor rate for each team member and subtask; 6) summing to arrive at the total labor cost; and 7) adding the total labor cost to any anticipated hardware costs to arrive at the estimated total for systems engineering and engineering development. As the Government prepares to enter into cooperative agreements for systems engineering, it is envisioned that initial cost estimates will be provided by the telecommunications carriers and equipment manufacturers as part of their proposals for individual network equipment modifications.

The Government estimates of systems engineering and engineering development costs have been compared against the level of funding anticipated for CALEA for each fiscal year. Initial reimbursement funding models indicate that selecting 14 of the 19 priority switching platforms identified in step 1 maximizes solution development and deployment of priority equipment within the limits of the $500,000,000 authorized to be appropriated for CALEA reimbursement efforts.

The industry business process schedules are fixed. Typically once the systems engineering phase begins, it is necessary to follow through with engineering development immediately thereafter, since new features and services developed in a product development cycle might greatly impact the software and hardware of a switching platform. Therefore, systems engineering performed for a feature may not be fully useable for the engineering development stage unless funding is immediately available to begin development. The Government will require a level of funding that ensures the continuity between systems engineering and engineering development in order to reimburse telecommunications carriers and equipment manufacturers for CALEA modifications. In other words, the timing of funding availability is critical (in order to ensure synchronization with the next update cycle) and the amount of funding is critical (in order to ensure completion of the cycle once it has begun). Section V provides the current status of FY funding availability and the resulting reimbursement plans.

The FBI is currently meeting with telecommunications carriers and equipment manufacturers to determine the earliest development cycle that can be (partially or wholly) dedicated to CALEA implementation. Terms and conditions for cooperative agreements, such as the notices of proposed rule-making for cost recovery rules, are also being finalized to prepare for CALEA solution development.

The FBI is evaluating several options to efficiently execute cooperative agreements. At present, three options have been identified as potential mechanisms for entering into cooperative agreements: 1) with carriers, who in turn direct manufacturers in developing a CALEA solution in a process that most closely matches the current industry relationships; 2) with equipment manufacturers directly, as they develop CALEA solutions; 3) with both carriers and equipment manufacturers, to allow for ongoing input from carriers while enabling direct association with equipment manufacturers as they develop CALEA solutions. These options are being discussed with industry to determine the preferred option(s), taking into consideration factors such as cost effectiveness of the option, the Government's ability to ensure technical and budgetary oversight for activities, and the optimum teaming of manufacturers and carriers for development oversight.

Currently the Government is pursuing the first option for cooperative agreements. The 19 equipment platforms were analyzed to determine optimum pairing with carriers to oversee systems engineering for each platform. The analysis of potential carriers for cooperative agreements was based on factors such as level of historical intercept activity on a platform, number of platforms in the carrier's network, location where the platforms were deployed, and as a means of streamlining systems engineering on multiple platforms to gain efficiency. Meetings were then held with candidate telecommunications carriers, manufacturers, and industry associations to present the approach for the systems engineering effort. These meetings represented a culmination of many on-going Government activities to support CALL implementation.

The meetings focused primarily on the content of the cooperative agreement, the draft Statement of Work for the systems engineering effort, carrier alignment with manufacturers for the 19 priority platforms, and references for analyzing technical requirements. Detailed reviews of the cooperative agreement and Statement of Work are on-going, and the Government and industry are currently in consultation to resolve issues that the industry may have with the documents. At this time, review of the Statement of Work is nearing completion. The Government is in discussion with the telecommunications carriers and manufacturers on the use of SR-3529, PN-3580, and additional documentation that details the outstanding issues that law enforcement believes should still be incorporated in the standard. This approach is needed so that the Government can fully assess how the carriers and manufacturers will specify detailed requirements and solutions that meet the CALEA requirements. Once agreement has been reached on the contents of the cooperative agreement, the Government will enter into the final formal steps leading to execution of cooperative agreements. Although cooperative agreements are being pursued with a limited number of telecommunications carriers to optimize resources, all non-proprietary results of the cooperative agreements will be shared with the industry, to include all carriers, regardless of their size and historical interception activity, that are subject to CALEA.

During the systems engineering effort, the carriers, manufacturers, and law enforcement will gain a detailed understanding of the technical and cost issues related to development on the different equipment platforms. The planning and scheduling for detailed design and development performed in preparation for the engineering development stage also provides key insight into equipment costs and ability to meet CALEA capability requirements. The knowledge gained during systems engineering will be used to determine which equipment platforms move into the engineering development phase.

Step 3: Engineering Development Priorities

The results from the systems engineering stage provide the necessary information to confirm the execution of cooperative agreements for engineering development on the selected equipment. During the systems engineering stage, trade-offs will be made to determine an optimum CALEA feature set for each platform, balancing costs with the ability to meet the CALEA capability requirements and hence law enforcement's needs. At this time, the Government will evaluate the cost-benefit of cooperative agreements for the engineering development stage for each platform.

Step 4: Systems Deployment Priorities

CALEA solutions will be available for deployment in telecommunications carrier networks following the engineering development stage. As engineering development progresses, a detailed assessment of carrier network equipment located in priority counties and markets will be performed to verify specific equipment where a CALEA solution will be deployed. Priority counties and markets will be determined based on historical interception activity and on areas of key concern to law enforcement, such as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA).

The costs for deployment of CALEA solutions will also be finalized during this stage. At this time, deployment priorities are necessary since the unit costs of deployment will dictate the total number of units that can be deployed. The number of individual systems earmarked for CALEA solution deployment will be adjusted as more definitive data become available.

V. PROJECTED REIMBURSEMENT PLAN

A. GOVERNMENT COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS

The implementation of CALEA compliant solutions in the telecommunications carrier networks will require carriers to modify network equipment, facilities, and services. To accommodate the necessary changes for those systems installed or deployed on or before January 1, 1995, the carriers need guidance from law enforcement about which of those elements will require modification. Law enforcement has focused, therefore, on identifying those equipment platforms in the carriers' networks that are of primary concern for CALEA capability. These priority equipment platforms, once identified, will be correlated to individual carrier networks to determine the corresponding priority carriers for implementation based on law enforcement's needs.

Under CALEA, the Attorney General may agree to pay the telecommunications industry for eligible compliance efforts. Therefore, the FBI (on behalf of the Attorney General and law enforcement) intends to enter into cooperative agreements for reimbursement of modifications to equipment platforms that are deemed high priority to law enforcement. Cooperative agreements help structure joint efforts between telecommunications carriers, equipment manufacturers, support service providers, and law enforcement. The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act (31 U.S.C. 6301 et. seq.) states that cooperative agreements are to be used when "the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of value to the...recipient to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the United States," and "substantial involvement is expected between the executive agency and the...recipient when carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement." (31 U.S.C. 6305) Cooperative agreements will serve as the vehicles for development and deployment of CALEA solutions in telecommunications networks. Cooperative agreements will be instituted in a manner that is consistent with the well-established business processes used by the telecommunications industry to make modifications to the network equipment. Funding of systems engineering and engineering development through cooperative agreements helps to control costs and mitigate risks for the Government while lessening the burden on carriers in the future as they comply with CALEA's provisions. Reimbursement of systems engineering and engineering development costs minimizes the total costs for carriers over time by reducing individual equipment platform deployment costs. Thus those carriers that upgrade or deploy the priority platforms in the future will have the benefit of lower costs for implementing CALEA solutions within their networks. In addition, many of the existing priority equipment platforms are being used to support emerging technologies such as PCS. Therefore, the Government's investment to upgrade the priority equipment platforms could lessen the financial burden for telecommunications carriers providing emerging services and technologies.

B. FUNDING AVAILABILITY FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

For FY 1997, the FBI anticipates the availability of a minimum of S100,000,000 for CALEA implementation. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 appropriated $60,000,000 to the FBI as "start-up" funds to begin CALEA implementation. The 1997 Act also established the Telecommunications Carrier Compliance Fund (TCCF) within the United States Treasury and authorized agencies with law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities to deposit unobligated balances into this Fund, subject to applicable Congressional reprogramming requirements. These reprogrammed funds would be available until expended. Using this authority, the Attorney General is proposing to make available an additional $40,000,000 from the Department of Justice Working Capital Fund:

The FBI, with Congressional instruction, has transferred $12,300,000 from FY 1996 unobligated funding to the Working Capital Fund;
The FBI has also transferred another $8,000,000 from prior year funding to the Working Capital Fund for CALEA;
Finally, the Department of Justice has proposed providing another $19,700,000 from the Working Capital Fund to support CALEA implementation.

Additionally, the FBI is working with other Federal law enforcement agencies and agencies with intelligence responsibilities to transfer eligible funds to the TCCF. On November 27, 1996, the attorney General sent a letter to all qualified Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies advising them of the TCCF and soliciting funding support. As of this date, there have been additional contributions to the TCCF. Discussion with other Federal law enforcement and national security agencies is on-going.

C. ESTIMATED REIMBURSEMENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

General cost and schedule estimates for systems engineering and engineering development have been developed based on current information available about the telecommunications industry business process. Using these estimates, the $100,000,000 anticipated to be available in FY 1997 will be allocated between systems engineering and engineering development activities. These estimates indicate that the Government will be able to undergo systems engineering for the majority of the priority equipment platforms and engineering development for several of the highest priority equipment platforms. This obligation of funds will control costs and minimize risks by ensuring that CALEA solutions are initiated for the specific platforms that have the maximum benefits to law enforcement.

The dollar amount allocated to each specific platform for systems engineering and the engineering development in FY 1997 will be determined as the Government executes cooperative agreements in early 1997. The FBI will be able to provide these estimated amounts in the next CALEA annual report. In addition since the cooperative agreement process has not yet begun, it is not possible to specify which carriers, manufacturers, and support service providers will receive reimbursement. The results of the systems engineering phase will include the technical assessment and cost assessment for costs incurred by the manufacturer for engineering development and systems deployment. These details will also be provided in the next CALEA annual report. Reimbursement depends, in large measure, upon carrier, manufacturer and support service provider responsiveness to the cooperative agreement process. As noted earlier, the FBI has already initiated discussion with carriers, along with their manufacturers and support service providers, to facilitate the cooperative agreement process.

Government cost estimates for the systems engineering, engineering development, and systems deployment stages for equipment platforms have been used to plan the CALEA solution development. These costs will be further defined for each platform as additional data becomes available to ensure an optimum balance between law enforcement's needs and industry's ability to meet those needs.

D. PROJECTED OUTYEAR REIMBURSEMENTS

While reimbursement via the cooperative agreement process focuses on systems engineering and engineering development for FY 1997, outyear reimbursement priorities will shift toward systems deployment. Fiscal year funding and outyear reimbursements will be balanced to ensure the optimum relative funding levels between systems engineering, engineering development, and systems deployment. The CALEA solution development and deployment process will begin and be completed under industry's schedules, so funding must be available at a pace consistent with these schedules. Further, sufficient funding must also be available to sustain the industry business process for priority equipment platforms. The systems engineering stage must be completed to obtain the necessary technical and cost analyses for each of the platforms. As stated earlier, these technical and cost analyses are necessary to make decisions to proceed with engineering development. However if sufficient funding is not available to initiate engineering development for priority platforms, the gap between these stages could require additional systems engineering for the CALEA solution since changes could have been made to the switching platform software and hardware over time.

Based upon current assumptions in the President's FY 1998 budget, the following reimbursements are estimated:

FY Amount

1997 $100 million

1998 $100 million

1999 $100 million ²

2000 $100 million ²

2001 $100 million ²

TOTAL: $500 million

NOTES

¹ In addition to switching platforms, there are other network elements that augment switching platforms in telecommunications carrier networks, such as INPs, that may be impacted by CALEA and are also being assessed.

² Actual amounts to be determined. Outyear funding will be affected by the future Presidential budget decisions and by the level of agency funds transferred to the TCCF. However, total funding will not exceed the $500 million authorization.

Back.

FY	Amount
1997	$100 million
1998	$100 million
1999	$100 million ²
2000	$100 million ²
2001	$100 million ²
TOTAL:	$500 million