Center for Democracy and Technology


105TH CONGRESS

S. 909: The McCain/Kerrey Bill

Impact of the McCain-Kerrey Bill on Constitutional Privacy Rights


Summary

The McCain-Kerrey encryption bill, like the Administration draft bill on which it is based, authorizes the government to obtain private keys and other highly sensitive decryption information without a court order and without notice to the individual whose privacy is being compromised. These bills raise serious Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns. They do not merely preserve current levels of government access, but rather seek to create a complex and burdensome system that would deprive individuals of their current privacy rights in the developing electronic environment.

The McCain-Kerrey Bill Expands Government Access Authority

The McCain-Kerrey bill, like the Administration bill, would give the government secret access to sensitive decryption keys without a court order. The bills require any third-party holding decryption keys to surrender them in response to a mere subpoena, issued without judicial approval and without notice to the encryption user. Under current law, without this legislation in effect, it is not clear that a trusted third party could be compelled to surrender an escrowed key without a court order, and certainly the government would have no way today to enforce secrecy upon an escrow agent without a court order.

The Administration's Approach Attempts to Make Surrender of Constitutional Rights a Condition of Participation in Electronic Commerce and Communication

The Administration and McCain-Kerrey bills essentially compel encryption users to disclose their keys to third parties, where the Administration believes they will be secretly available to the government without meeting normal Fourth and Fifth Amendment requirements. The sponsors of the legislation argue that their approach is voluntary and that nobody would have to participate in key recovery. We believe that the bills are essentially compulsory, using a mixture of an unnecessary linkage between licensed certificate authorities and key recovery, plus the federal procurement power, the wide reach of federal funding in the education world, and continued export controls tied to key recovery, to encourage encryption users to escrow their keys.

Whether the legislation is truly voluntary or voluntary in name only, its goal is to produce a future in which many encryption users store their keys with third parties where they can be accessed without a court order and without notice.

The Administration's Approach Deprives Encryption Users of Notice that their Keys Have Been Subpoenaed, Avoiding a Fundamental Fourth Amendment Protection

We believe decryption keys are so central to the emerging world of online association and commerce that the government should be required to obtain the approval of a judge in order to compel disclosure of a key. Even if the government can use a mere subpoena to compel an encryption user who does not participate in key recovery to disclose something as sensitive and central to privacy as a decryption key, the government currently must provide notice by serving the subpoena on the user, who can then obtain court review of the subpoena before having to comply. The Administration key recovery plan seeks to avoid this requirement, by using a combination of mechanisms to migrate users into a system under which they disclose their keys to third parties.

The Administration's Approach Avoids the Fifth Amendment Protection Accorded to Unwritten Keys and Passwords

Under the Fifth Amendment, an individual cannot be compelled to testify to his or her memorized key. Even if the private key is written or stored on a computer and its production can be compelled notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment, the government cannot compel a person to disclose his or her memorized password, which will often be necessary to use the private key. Again, by trying to move users into key recovery, the Administration proposal and the McCain-Kerrey bill seek to avoid this constitutional privilege.

Conclusion: Key Recovery as Proposed by the Administration Is Not a Status Quo Proposal

Currently, contrary to the claims of the Administration, when the govern-ment obtains access to encrypted data or communications using any of the means at its disposal, the government is not assured of having access to the necessary decryption information without notice. Even if the government has a court order to obtain access to communications from a telecommunications service provider, the service provider may not have the keys to communications of users.

The Administration and the McCain-Kerrey sponsors argue that they are merely trying to preserve the status quo. By "status quo," they must mean a world in which no one uses encryption. That world has ceased to exist. Unescrowed, essentially unbreakable encryption is widely available, and widely used, especially by businesses for stored files and by businesses and individuals for e-mail. Law enforcement has begun to encounter encryption, especially in stored data.

The primary purpose of the Administration bill and the McCain-Kerrey bill is to get current and future users of encryption to participate in key recovery. Especially with respect to communications (as opposed to stored data), most encryption users currently do not escrow their keys, and in the future will not do so in the absence of a government scheme encouraging or compelling them to do so. Encryption users will voluntarily adopt key recovery mechanism for some applications, but not for others, based on need, risk, cost, and other market factors.

Therefore, currently there are situations in which the government can obtain the private key it needs to read encrypted information only from the individual encryption user, in which case the Fourth and Fifth Amendments apply. This requires under the Fourth Amendment at least notice to the encryption user. It may require a court order. And in some cases, the Fifth Amendment limits the government's access. That is the status quo.

-- Will this Effort to Circumvent the Constitution Be Permitted?

The Administration believes that it has found a way around basic Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The Administration believes that once decryption keys or other recovery information are lodged with third parties, the keys can be treated like normal business records, which are not protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. McCain-Kerrey adopts this view. We believe that stored encryption keys should not be treated like ordinary business records but are entitled to higher protection, even in the hands of third parties. In addition, it is a difficult question whether the courts would permit the Administration to create a system in which people surrender their constitutional privacy rights as a condition of fully participating in electronic commerce and communications.

In any case, whether or not the Administration is correct that its attempted end run around the Constitution would withstand judicial scrutiny, it is undeniable that the linkage of certificate authorities and key escrow would create a system giving the government secret subpoena access to decryption information that it cannot obtain today under a mere subpoena with no notice to the encryption user and no judicial approval. The system proposed in the Administration and McCain-Kerrey bills is structured to get around the protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments available under current practices. These bills cannot be characterized as preserving current access.

I. Linkage Between Certificate Authority and Key Escrow Effectively Compels Users to Participate in Key Escrow

The Administration and McCain-Kerrey bills would use a combination of mechanisms to effectively compel encryption users to store "spare" decryption keys or other "recovery information" with third parties where the Administration believes they would be available to the government without a court order.

The primary mechanism of promoting key recovery is the bills' artificial linkage between certificate authorities and key recovery. Admin. bill, § 203; McCain-Kerrey, § 405. Certificate authorities ("CAs") are trustworthy entities such as banks or credit card companies that can provide assurances of identity in cyberspace. Key recovery involves an encryption user storing a "spare" key or other decryption information with a third party, where it can be retrieved in the event that the user loses or forgets his or her key. There are some situations, particularly involving stored data, where businesses will want to escrow a spare key to ensure access to their data in the event an employee dies or quits or forgets the key.

The marketplace is already developing certificate authority systems and key escrow (or "data recovery") systems, sorting out what works and what doesn't. Thus, there is no need for government to encourage electronic commerce by regulating either CAs or escrow agents. Yet the Administration and McCain-Kerrey bills create a regulatory structure involving government licensing of CAs and recovery agents.

Under the Administration and McCain-Kerrey bills, the price of using a licensed CA for encryption purposes will be participation in key recovery. The bills state that an encryption user cannot obtain a certificate for encryption from a licensed certificate authority without escrowing a copy of his or her private decryption key or other "recovery information." Admin. bill, §203; McCain-Kerrey, §405. Absent such a legislated requirement, while most encryption users would want to use licensed CAs, many would not want to escrow, especially for communications. There is no logical linkage between the function of certificate authorities and the totally separate issue of key escrow, but this is the hook that the Administration has presently chosen to impose on the digital world its desire for surreptitious access to decryption keys.

II. Current Law and Practice Does Not Guarantee the Government Secret Access to Decryption Keys or Other Recovery Information

In an effort to downplay the significance of its proposal, the Administration has argued that it is only seeking to ensure the ability to obtain plaintext of communications that it has already obtained in encrypted form. On this basis, the Administration tries to argue that it is seeking no new authority.

Contrary to the Administration's claim, under current law and practice, if the government obtains access to encrypted data or communications using any of the surreptitious means at its disposal, it is not assured of having surreptitious access to the necessary decryption information.

The government currently obtains data or communications in many instances without the approval of a judge and without even the use of a subpoena. Encrypted data or files can be provided by an informant or disgruntled employee or undercover agent, who obtains access with consent and copies the data and provides it to the government. No court approval is required for use of informants or undercover operatives. The government can dumpster dive along with anybody else, and does, routinely obtaining documents from garbage cans. In certain situations, businesses can intercept the communications of their employees, service providers can intercept the communications of their customers, and universities can intercept the communications of their students, all without judicial approval, and turn them over to the government. None of these mechanisms guarantees access to decryption keys.

Even if the government has a court order to obtain access to communications from a telecommunications service provider, the service provider will not have the keys to communications of users. The government cannot obtain the plaintext of those communications from anyone other than a party to the communication.

Absent legislation, some users will escrow keys with third parties, where they may be available to the government. But especially with respect to communications (as opposed to stored data), most people will not escrow keys in the absence of a government scheme encouraging or compelling them to do so.

III. Fourth Amendment Issues

A. Access to Sensitive Decryption Information Without Notice Evades a Crucial Safeguard

The Administration bill and the McCain-Kerrey bill prohibit an escrow agent from disclosing the existence of a subpoena to the person whose key or recovery information is being sought. Admin. draft, §304; McCain-Kerrey, §110. In other words, the very person with the most at stake could not be told that a subpoena has been issued and is being complied with.

This denial of notice has several implications, and is the most clear-cut example of how the Administration and McCain-Kerrey bills avoid current constitutional procedures.

Notice is a central element of the Fourth Amendment. Just recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that notice is a normally indispensable element of the Fourth Amendment. Richards v. Wisconsin (April 28, 1997); see also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). Subpoenas are issued on less than probable cause and without prior judicial authorization. The courts have held that the main mechanism making subpoenas permissible is the fact that a subpoena recipient has notice and therefore can obtain prior judicial review before having to comply. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.13. By constructing a scheme that denies notice to the encryption user -- the person whose interests are being compromised and thus the person most likely to challenge a subpoena -- the bills remove what courts have viewed as the most important protection against abuse of the subpoena power.1

Denying notice has certain practical implications that contribute to the insecurity of the Administration's proposal, even aside from the constitutional concerns. Given the high likelihood of mistaken disclosure of keys under a system as complex as that contemplated by the Administration proposal, encryption users should know that their key has been requested by someone claiming to be an authorized government agent, so that they can determine if the request for their keys was erroneous or the result of spoofing.

B. Access to Sensitive Decryption Information Upon Mere Subpoena Is Open to Mistake, Fraud and Abuse

Subpoenas Are Issued Without Judicial Approval and Offer Little Privacy Protection

The Administration and McCain-Kerrey bills would require escrow agents to disclose other people's keys when presented with a subpoena. Section 106(3) of McCain-Kerrey provides:

A key recovery agent, whether or not registered by the Secretary under this Act, shall disclose recovery information to a Federal or State government entity ... upon the receipt of a subpoena ... which is based upon a duly authorized warrant or court order ...; a subpoena authorized by or based on authority established by Federal or State law, statute, precedent or rule; ... . (Emphasis added.)

Few people realize how little protection a subpoena offers against mistake, overreaching and abuse. In federal criminal investigations, it is remarkably easy for the government to obtain a subpoena. Subpoenas are issued without judicial approval. Whenever a grand jury is created, subpoenas are issued in blank to the Assistant United States Attorney, who fills them in and signs them without even discussing them with the judge or grand jury. In many instances, the documents produced are never actually seen by the grand jury. Moreover, some law enforcement agencies such as the DEA and the IRS have administrative subpoena authority, meaning that their agents can issue subpoenas demanding release of documents even without the approval of a prosecutor.

Furthermore, there are nearly two hundred grants of subpoena authority to federal administrative agencies, virtually the entire alphabet soup of the regulatory bureaucracy, which can issue subpoenas in civil investigations of a wide range of regulatory matters, again without judicial approval. A list of federal grants of subpoena authority to administrative agencies is available from CDT.

Such authorizations are generally very broad, empowering the government agency to subpoena "any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, or other records that the Secretary deems relevant or material" to an investigation. The investigative authority of administrative agencies is nearly unlimited. According to the Supreme Court, an administrative agency (or a grand jury) "can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not." United States v. Morton Salt Co. 338 U.S. 632, 642-643 (1950).2

The following examples show the broad range of minor agencies and administrative organizations and programs that have subpoena power: The Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to issue subpoenas in order to implement the Milk, Soybean, Mushroom, Lime, Fresh Cut Flowers and Fresh Cut Greens, Pecan, Watermelon, Pork, Beef, Fish and Seafood and Honey Promotion Programs. The Family and Medical Leave Act grants subpoena power to the Secretary of Labor. The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act authorizes the Secretary of Interior to issue subpoenas. In the course of investigations and hearings into mismarked, substandard, counterfeit, and other nonconforming fasteners, the Secretary of Commerce may issue subpoenas.

In many instances, the subpoena authority can be delegated to mid- and lower-level employees: Upon authority of the National Transportation Safety Board, any member of the Board, any administrative law judge employed by or assigned to the Board, or any officer or employee duly designated by the Chairman, may... require by subpoena... the production of such evidence as the Board or such officer or employee deems advisable. 49 U.S.C. § 1903. For the purpose of inspections and investigations into possible violations of the Motor Vehicle Odometer Requirements statute, the Secretary of Transportation may authorize any officer or employee of the Department of Transportation to issue subpoenas for the production of "such books, papers, correspondence, memorandums, contracts, agreements, or other records as the Secretary, or such officer or employee, deems advisable."

The Administration proposal and the McCain-Kerrey bill also require disclosure of recovery information in response to subpoenas issued by any state or local government entity. There are over 15,000 state and local law enforcement agencies. In addition, there are uncounted numbers of state and local agencies, boards, and other bodies that have civil subpoena authority, all of which under the Administration bill and the McCain-Kerrey bill would have the power to compel escrow agents and recovery agents to disclose keys or other decryption assistance held in trust on behalf of their clients.

Finally, the Administration and McCain-Kerrey bills require that keys be disclosed to foreign governments, with no defined standards, upon the request of the U.S. government. Admin. bill, §302(A)(2); McCain-Kerrey, §106(2)(b).

Is a Mere Subpoena Adequate to Compel Disclosure of a Private Key?

The Administration argues that the subpoena access provision merely preserves the status quo. The denial of notice, we believe, conclusively rebuts this contention. But there is a broader question as to whether a mere subpoena is sufficient to compel disclosure of decryption information if served on either a third party or on the encryption user. The compelled disclosure of decryption information poses concerns quite different from those normally applied to business records under United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), especially when participation in electronic commerce is conditioned on participation in a key escrow or data recovery scheme accessible to the government. In fact, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that the government cannot always use a mere subpoena to compel even from a third party production of a person's private, personal documents, in which category we would place a person's decryption key. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401 n. 7; 1 Beale, Bryson, Felman & Elston, Grand Jury Law and Practice, §6.27 (1986 & 1996 Cum. Supp.).

IV. Fifth Amendment Issues

Disclosure of keys as contemplated by the Administration also raises serious questions under the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled self incrimination. Generally, the courts have held that a voluntarily created document does not contain compelled testimonial evidence. Almost all these cases, however, have arisen in the context of business records. The leading case, Fisher v. United States, supra, involved a subpoena of accountants' workpapers relating to two taxpayers, which were in the possession of the taxpayers' attorney. The Fisher Court itself recognized that there may be some category of private papers that are protected under the privilege against self-incrimination. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414. The federal Circuit Courts of Appeal are split. Two federal Appeal Courts have held that the Fifth Amendment bars compelled disclosure of private, non-business papers. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F. 2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980). If anything, the privacy concerns reflected in these cases may be even stronger with respect to private decryption keys, which form such a central enabling role to the protection of privacy itself in the digital age.

Even if the courts hold that a written key does not constitute testimonial evidence, most people who use encryption store their key under a memorized password. Here the Fifth Amendment law is clearer. An individual cannot be compelled to reveal a memorized password. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n. 9 (1988). This goes to the heart of the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination.

Conclusion

Key recovery as envisioned in the McCain-Kerrey and Administration bills goes far beyond the status quo and does far more than merely preserve current access. Currently, the law requires at least that the government serve a subpoena on the encryption user, giving the user notice and an opportunity to challenge the request and protect against any mistake or fraud. In addition, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments may require a judicial order (subpoenas are issued without judicial approval), and the Fifth Amendment likely prohibits compelled disclosure of memorized keys or passwords from the user. The bills try to avoid these constitutional constraints by creating a system in which people give their keys to third parties where -- the government believes -- they would be accessible under a mere subpoena issued and executed without judicial approval and without notice to the person whose privacy is being compromised. This may or may not be constitutional -- we believe it is not -- but it certainly is a structure designed to give government officials (and others appearing to be government officials) access not available today.

NOTES

1 We do not contend that a grand jury or an administrative agency issuing a subpoena to a third party is required to give notice to the record subject or target. To the contrary, there is generally no such requirement. See SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735 (1984). Our focus here is on the attempt to force sensitive decryption keys into the hands of third parties in the first place, in an attempt to evade notice.

2 "[E]ven if one were to regard the request for information . . . as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest. Id., 338 U.S. at 652.


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