U.S. Encryption Policy
"Clipper Chip" (Escrowed Encryption Standard) : April 16, 1993
In 1993, the Clinton administration announced an encryption initiative involving a "state-of-the-art microcircuit," known as the "Clipper Chip", that could be attached to an ordinary telephone. The cryptographic device was intended to protect private communications while permitting law enforcement officials to circumvent encryption devices that they claimed were hampering their ability to detect criminal activity. The Escrowed Encryption Standard (a.k.a. "Clipper") used a "key escrow" system, in which two keys would be deposited separately with two government agents. The key escrow agents would be chosen by the Attorney General.
Reference documents on Clipper
White House announcement of "Clipper Chip" technology
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) fact sheet on technical specifications
White House Fact Sheet on Public Encryption Management
On September 15, 1993, the President announced a thorough review of Federal policies on encryption technology.
The President announced plans to enhance the ability of U.S. manufacturers to compete in domestic and international markets on November 4, 1993..
On February 4, 1994, Attorney General Reno announced the two entities that would serve as key escrow agents -- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a part of the Department of Commerce, and the
Automated Systems Division of the Department of the Treasury.
"Clipper Chip: A Technical Summary"
Other NIST documents relating to the revised policy
The EFF Clipper
Archive. Contains NSA documents, and other relevant materials relating to the failed
Clipper Chip Government Key Escrow proposal.
Privacy and Security Concerns
Failed to protect privacy rights of individuals. Placing sensitive private keys in the hands of the government violated the privacy of individuals. Moreover, procedures to obtain keys raised concerns. To obtain access to a key, the law enforcement official would have had to obtain a warrant to perform a wiretap. However, they were permitted to fax a request to the key escrow agents merely claiming to have a warrant, without having to present actual documentation of the wiretapping order. Furthermore, there were no requirements for the destruction of the key after wiretapping was completed. Obtaining the key would have allowed those law enforcement officials to access all conversations for as long as that particular phone was operational.
Created risky key escrow system. The Clipper Chip initiative proposed placing all keys for all encrypted communications into the hands of only two or three agencies. This scenerio provided an opportunity for corruption and abuse of power.
Used potentially insecure algorithm. The encoding algorithm, known as "Skipjack", was developed in secret by the National Security Agency (NSA). Cryptographic experts viewed the secrecy surrounding Skipjack with skepticism, because algorithms are usually submitted for peer review to identify weaknesses. On
June 24, 1998, the NSA finally declassified Skipjack.
Violated principles behind Computer Security Act of 1987. Congress passed the Computer Security Act in 1987, limiting the role of the NSA in developing standards for civilian communications. Despite this law, the NSA was still integrally involved in developing the Clipper Chip, a civilian communications device.
Highlights from the Debate
Jerry Berman's testimony before the Committee on Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation on May 3, 1994. The testimony was part of the House Hearing on Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security. At the time, Jerry Berman was the Executive Director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
In a July 1994 letter to then Representative Maria Cantwell, Vice President Gore announced that the Administration intended to re-examine
its cryptography policy. The Gore letter, which was widely viewed as an
abandonment of the Clipper Chip government key escrow scheme, pledged to
develop a policy framework that would promote the development of
encryption systems that would meet the following criteria:
Implementation in hardware of Software
Public, Unclassified Algorithms
Voluntary
Fourth Amendment privacy Safeguards
Statutory liability rules to protect users
Multiple Escrow Agents
Floor statement of Rep. Jack Brooks on June 15, 1994 regarding the stifling effect of encryption export controls on US industry.
Skipjack review report, published July 28, 1993, asserting that NSA algorithm "there is no significant risk that SKIPJACK will be broken in next 30-40 years."
"Chipping Away at Privacy" by Shari Steele and Daniel Weitzner
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