It makes key escrow a precondition for participation in the public key infrastructure - Other than law enforcement
       access, there is no reason the public key infrastructure must store private keys. On the contrary, the essential
       breakthrough of public key cryptography is the ability it gives users to share public key information and partake fully in
       authenticated, secure communications without revealing any private key information to third parties. Data recovery --
       the ability to recover encrypted data if a private key is lost -- is the main rationale presented for key escrow. However,
       data recovery can be done independently of the public key infrastructure if desired, and in a more secure manner.

       It is not voluntary -- Though participation is theoretically "voluntary," under Clipper III users will have no choice but to
       escrow their keys or forego participation in the Information Age economy. The proposal itself calls the key
       infrastructure a "basic and entirely essential foundation." To participate, users will need to escrow their keys; if they
       choose not to participate in the KMI, users will be unable to obtain the essential certifications that the Administration
       foresees as being the standard for secure electronic communications and commerce. 

       It targets domestic users -- While export controls have ostensibly been aimed at controlling the use of encryption by
       foreign users, the Clipper III proposal is clearly aimed at domestic users of encryption.

       It leaves international key exchange problems unresolved -- Without a system of international agreements,
       interoperability is at risk. The same encryption and/or authentication scheme exportable to Germany or France might not
       be exportable to India or China in the absence of appropriate bilateral agreements. Bilateral agreements raise their own
       issues: under what standards will keys be released to foreign governments, especially those with no tradition of Fourth
       Amendment search and seizure protection?

       It contains no key escrow privacy provisions -- The Administration proposal only tangentially addresses the privacy
       problems posed by key escrow systems. As others have already noted in the encryption policy debate, any key escrow
       system (even if voluntary) raises issues regarding the need for: liability rules for unauthorized key disclosures by
       escrow agents; standards for law enforcement access; auditing requirements for escrow agents; and guidelines for
       decryption information access.4 Clipper III contains no such standards or guidelines.

       It compromises network security by encouraging storage of private key information -- Clipper III requires the
       accumulation of private keys or other decryption information in dangerous and vulnerable points-of-failure -- the
       escrow agents. At the same time as it seeks to design a secure infrastructure, the proposal builds enormous new
       vulnerabilities into the system.

       It is not responsive to years of feedback from industry and policy advocates --The proposal answers few of the
       concerns repeatedly raised by privacy advocates or industry. It reflects a policy-making process still driven by national
       security and law enforcement concerns rather than the privacy needs of individuals and the security needs of the online
       economy.